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INTRODUCTION
1.1 The instrument Landing Approach
decision heights (ICAO, 1965 and 1970).
1
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CHAPTER I
The instrument landing system (IIS) has been in civil use
since 1947 and is in operation at about 600 airports throughout
the world, half of them in the United States. Its name, however,
1
is a misnon-er. It should more properly be called an instrumnt
low-approach system, as a pilot must establish visual reference
i
with the ground in the last phase of the approach to complete the
landing. This is the "see-to-land" concept (DeCelles, 1970). j
w elevation at which aThe FFUrs^smnn height above the run ay	 9
pilot Faust abort the approach if the required visual reference
has not been established is the "r?acision height". At present,
-i
five categories of instrurpemt landing approaches are classified
by the International Civil Aviation Organization, with different
Table :_.1 ICAO Categories
Category	 Decision Height (ft.) 	 Runway Visual Range: (ft.)
I 200 2400
11 100 1200
IIIA 0 700
IIIB 0 150
1I1C 0 0
The category under which an ILS approach is conducted depends
on the certification of the particular aircraft and its crew and
on the available ground equipment at the airport. Category I landings
have been carried out for almost tliirty years; the first eigh^.
United States airports were certificated for Category 11 operations
i
in August of 1968. At the present time- there is only one runway
in the United States which is certificated for Category ILIA operations.
V
The ILS is a precision approach system which provides accurate
course alignment and ;Aide slope descent information during the
approach by way of specialized equipment on the ground and on board
the aircraft:
1. The glide slope transmitter, usually installed between
2
t
k
750 and 1250 feet from the approach end of the runway, establishes
a radiation pattern in space from which a signal is derived propor-
tional to the aircraft's vertical angular displacement from the glide
path. This signal drives the up-down glide slope deviation indicator
(GST) needle and is one of the inputs to the longitudinal flight--
dixector in the aircraft. The glide slope beam width is approximately
1.5°, half above and half iDolaa the glide slope line. The glide slope
line e.Levati.on is usually 2.50 1 	 .5° above the 1Z0rizontal.
2. The localizer-transmitter is usually installed approximately
1000 feet beyond  and 300 feet to ;he side of the far end of the
runway with the aaitenna in line with the runway centerline. The
localize: establishes a radiation paLtexn in space from which a
signal is derived proportional to the lateral angular displacement
from the vertical plane through the runway centerline. This sigoal 	 {
drives the left:-right. course deviation indicator (MI) needle and
is one of tbe inputs to the lateral flight director in the aircraft.
The localizer beam width is approximately 50, half to the right and
half to the left of the runway centerline extension.
3. Marker bcac:ons and optional compass locators provide
definite fixes along the approach as distance spot checks. The outer
marker is placed on the rwzway centerline extension at a distance
of from 4 to 7 miles from the runway threshold; the i;iiddle marker is
placed where the glide slope is 200 feet above the runway elevation
and identifies the Category Y decision height; the inner marker is
3
f:
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placed where the glide slope is at the Category II decision height
or to indicates runway threshold passage. In addition to an audible
tone, the outer marker lights a purple l.aup on the instrua-ent panel;
the middle marker, an amber latrp; and the inner marker, a vAiite lamp.
1.2 Background
In the last decade, a great deal of thought has been given to
Category III landings and their trap .icatioals. one area of intensive
investigation centered around t:e role of the crew during the
approach, and current thought is polarized around two extremes:
1. The crew is in the control loop and flies the aircraft in
accordance with instrmn-ant-generated signals.
2. Steering signals are coupled directly into the autopilot,
with the crew monitoring the system.
Crew control based on the steering signals is favored by many crewmen
and operations personnel (I:ayton, 1969), and ccmprehensive manual
control.-display theories have been developed (Clement et aZ., 1968;
McRuer et aZ., 1967) to facilitate the design of optimal equipment.
For reasons of economy, civil aviation authorities and oourrtercial
carriers prefer to retain the IIS for Category III guidance and are
4
working to set standards for campatible airborne equipment. Phe
ILS localizer can probably be made usable for lateral guidance during
Category III touchdowns. The ZLS glide slope is not usable, hay.,°ever,
below approximately 100 feet of altitude, because of the parabolic
shape of the beam in that region. Thus, for vertical guidance near
the runway, Category III landing systems must be based on non-IL,S
equipment such as microwave guidance or a radio altimeter.
During 'he early phases of an uncoupled final approach, at
.-ltiitudes greater than the decision height, steering information
presented to the pilot by the flight director. This system
ZLic:orrnrates as inputs not only the raw GSI and CDI position data
17ut also rate information and thus relieves the pilot of the need
to generate large leads in synthesizing the information (DeCelles,	 {
1970). New features axe constantly being added i-j existing flight
director systems (Monroe et al., 1968); they & •e, however, inadequate
Y'
	
	 as a mode of guidance during the final phase of the landing (DeCelles,
op. cit.) and their perfo_--mance during simulated Category III landing
studies has been disappointing (Gainer et al., 1967), presumably
because of increased worldcads caused by the manual control mode
and because of excessive dispersion at touchdams .
the first fully automatic landing in airli n. , passenger service
occurred two years later. Since then, great progress has been achieved
in the development of automatic landing systems. The simplex, fail--
hard couplers of yore have been replaced by redundant duplex systems
and triply-redundant autopilots which provide fail--soft capability
in the event of two simultaneous failures. Many systems are available
today, such as TATAR, F1LzMSCAN and AUTOLAND, to name just a few.
Yet computers are only h=an, and crews demand the capability
of monitoring the progress of the landing via displays which utilize
signals and data processors completely independent of the autopilot
(DeCelles, op. cit.). Indeed, a number of independent landing monitor
(ILM) concepts and configurations have been proposed to date, both	 a
d
the conventional pai+c.l-inounted variety (Bencivenga, 1970) and the
=	 3
heads--up display (Huo) type (Parks and Tubb, 1970; Jenney et aZ. ,1971) .
Some of these concepts have been evaluated in flight: An instr^Jnt
panel display for monitoring automatic landings was flight-tested
in a DC-7 at the National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center
j
(Pursel, 1968), while in France a HUD all-weather approach and landing
monitor is being flown on board a Nord-262 (Dunbar rind Collins, 1972).
;i
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1.3 Objectives of the Thesis
E
i
It is axiomatic that a pilot should be capable of detecting
}
and identifying failures in the automatic landing system accurately,
reliably and with minimal time delay. To this end, extensive studies
have been conducted in which the pilot was treated as a controlling
element in a one-dimensional task; his decision processes (Schrenk,
1969) and his adaptive behavior following a sudden change in the
controlled plant dynamics were investigated (Young et al., 1964;
Phatak and Bekey, 1969). Other studies investigated the failure-
s
detection xrformance, treating the operator as a pure monitor
d
	
	 (Gai and Carry, 1975). In reality, the pilot is faced with multi-
axes, not single-axis, tasks; although ncdels for interference amang
multiple control tasks have been derived (Levison, 1970), the inter-
relationships between simultaneous control and monitoring tasks
are not as yet well understood (Levison, 1971).
Young et aZ. (op. cit.) found that in single-axis tracking
tasks the human operator's performance as a failure detector was
]getter when he was in the control loop; simulated Category III
landing studies, on Use other hand, revealed that the pilot's failure
detection performance deteriorated when he was faced with a manual
control task, compared to the monitoring mode (Vreuls et al., 1968a
7
1and 1968b). V7hen faced with split-axis tasks, pilots' monitoring
and decision making was impaired (Monroe et al., 1968) and they
sometimes completely overlooked the occurrence of a failure,
presumably because of the increased workload associated with split-
axis tasks compared to a mnitoring task (Gainer et aZ., 1967).
The inadequacy of the human operator as a fault detector led to the
i	
development of -performance--monitoring hardware. (Smith et al. , 1972)
which has been installer) in many troderil aircraft (Jester, 1973) .
I
Even with the aid c~ such aruiunciatc - panels the pilot's performance,
under: certain conditions, leaves much to be desired (Semple et al.,
1968).
It has been recognized that when the role of the human o _iator
changes from monitoring to that of an active controller, corresponding
€	 changes take place in his workload level (Ekstrom, 1962; Wewerinke).
However, in pilot performance studies to date these effects were	
i
completely confounded. It is the priory purpose of this investigation
to separate these effects and to document pilot performance during
a Category III landing as a function of the particular control
mode at different workload levels. We wish to .isolate and identify
the effects on performance due to the variations in the control
E	 mode alone - and hence, variations in the operator's mde of behavior
p	 apart from the effects on performance due to the variations in the
workload level.
i
i g
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1.4 Research Method
As stated, the purpose of this research was the stl-rjy of the
pilot's short term decisions regarding performance assessment and
failure monitoring. We wished to investigate the relationship between
the pilot's ability to detect failures, his degree of participation
in the control task and his over-all workload level. Also, we wished
our findings to be applicable to the general population of pilots who
fly law-visibility approaches in co -rcial jet transport aircraft.
To this end, this research conaisted of an experimntal inves-
tigation: which was carried out in a static ground simulator. Airline
pilots flew zero-visibility landing approaches with different degrees
of automation and at different workload levels, which were induced
by simulated wind disturbances. The pilots' ability to detect failures
and to provide a reliable manual back-up capability was monitored
and recorded.
The data were analyzed to identify statistically significant
relationships among the experimental  treatments and the factors which
produced the optimal performance were sought.
9
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1.5 Results of the Thesis Research
The investigation has examined the effects of the pilot's
participation node in the flying task an his workload level and
failure-detection performance. At found that the participation
mode had a strong effect on the pilot's workload, the induced workload
being lowest when the pilot acted as a monitoring element during a
cotxnled approach and highest when the pilot was an active element in
the control loop. In addition, a very ma ked increase in workload
at altitudes below approximately 500 feet was documented at all
participation modes; this increase was inversely related to distance-
to-go.
The effects of workload and participation node on failure
detection were separated.. The participation rude was shown to have
a d minant effect on the failure detection performance, with a
failure in a monitored (coupled) axis being detected significantly
faster than a comparable fa.ilux'e in a nonaally controlled axis.
Touchdown performance was also documented and the findings
of previous investigators were supported, namely that the conven-
tional instrument panel and its associated displays were quite
.inadequate for zero--visibility operations in the final phases of
the simulated landing approach.
10
CHAPTER II
THE EXPERIMENT
2.1 EQ3thco s
In analyzing his performance as a systems component, the
h non can be assumel to possess information-processing capacity
which is fixed and constant in any given set of conditions (Brown,
1964). As long as the information processing demands, which are
imposed on th4 operator, are considerably less than this max,mal
capacity, the human's information sampling rate will be lLnited
only by the presentation rate and by his own display scan rate
limitations. When the demands are increased, however, the human
must reduce his information sampling rate.
if the harm serves as a controlling element in the system,
the reduced sampling rate will manifest itself in increased lag
and hence, to maintain an adequate phase margin, the operator will
reduce his gain which, in turn, will effect an increased RTS tracking
error. if he acts as a failure monitoring elect, then failure-
detection times will be increased. These assumptions underline
our hypotheses
1. Both operator participation level in the control task
and his overall workload affect the Vformation-processing require-
vents. The effects, then. -f the operator ` s participation level and
workload on his .failure detection performance are additive. Manual
tracking will result in longer detection times than will monitoring
a coupled autonut.ic approach, and high workloads will manifest them
selves in linger detection times than will low workload levels.
2. As the fliyht instruicnts display angular, rather than
linear, deviations fran the locaj izea_ course and glide path, they
increase in sensitivity as distance to L-ouch-da-in decreases. In
addition, the penalty for error increases with increased proximity
to the grouid. Wditional pri cessing demands are therefore placed
on the pilot and hence his workload increases in inv rse proporticon
to the altitude or to distanca-to go.
The validity of these hypotheses will be tested experimentally
in a fixed-base cockpit simulator with the aid of a workload-measure-
meat device.
2.2 Workload M asure3nent Theory
As was already stated in Section 2.1, the Duman operator is
postulated to possess finite, fitted capacity to perform well on
t
12
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tasks such as manual tracking or information processing (Brown, 1964).
This total capacity, TC, is assumad to be constant in a given set
of conditions such that the performance is inversely related to the
amunt of workload required in excess of this level.
Men the human operator is performing a task which requires
less than his total capacity, then his total capacity is divided
into the expanded capacity, EC, and tl-ie fraction which is unused,
the residual capacity, PC:
TC = EC+RC
	 (2.1)
A now classic example of these concepts was given, during evaluation
of alternative control modes for the X-15 research aircraft (Ekstrom,
1962). The subject first perfr:rw-d a self-paced choice-reaction
pushbutton task, and his scores were recorded. As this was a self-
paced task and the subject was well-motivated, these scores were
assumed to represent his total capacity. Next, the subject performed
the primary control task concurrently with and at the expense of
the subsidiary pushbutton task. if the subsidiary task response
was reduced to 40 percent of the level obtained w3hen performing
the subsidiary task alone, then this would be taken as an indication
that the operator needed 100 - 40 = 60 percent of his attention to
perform the primary control task. The results of this analysis
13
showed that the pilot could use both cont—l' modes equally well
but that one mode required less of the pilot's attention and there-
fore, in terms of workload penalty, was superior to the other.
In this application, the auxiliary task is introduced as a
measuring tool. It is used to determine the price paid in operator
effort in meting the performance criteria of ;lie primary task.
The rationale for using the subsidiary task is that as the load
of the primary task is increased, performance on the subsidiary
task will deteriorate, thus ai_ving a measure of how much additional
work the operator can h:mdle while still meeting system criteria
of the primary task. The situation is illustrated schematically in
Figure 2.1.
2.3 Requirements of the Auxiliary Task
The problem of defining the requirements of the auxiliary
task is complicated by the simple fact that different experiments
impose different specific demands upon the auxxiliary task, thus
hampering the development of a universal subsidiary task.
A generalized set of desired charactarzstics, however, can
be described for the auxiliary task. These characteristics do not
14
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TASK
Task 1: s. t. alone	 s.t.=subsidiary task
Task 2: p. t. #1 + s. t. 	 p.-,.=primary task
Task 3: p. t. #2 +s-t.
Fig. 2.1 Auxiliary Task Score Reflects Primary
Task Difficulty
1.5
define any one particular auxi.l.iaxy task; they merely narrow down
the selection to a smaller number of possible alternatives, of which
the one is chosen which satisfies the additional requirements of the
case in point.
2.3.1 The Multiplex Model
The subsidiary task is used to measure the reserve capacity
of the operator daring what is essentially normal performance of the
primary task. it should, therefore, be subtle in its effect on the
primary task; it should by dexanding enough so that the operator
cannot, ignore it, yet not so demanding as to stress the primary
task to the point of disruption (Knowles, 1963). In analyzing the
specific requirements of subsidiary tasks, it is helpful to turn
to a rather simple, yet effective, single channel multiplex model
which has been proposed to summarize the basic notions of operator
loading and its measurement by subsidiary task scores (Knowles,
1973; Szoadbent, 1957). A meltiplcx system uses a single, fixed
capacity channel 61 tr,nsmit messages from several sources to
several destinations. only nnssagcs from one source to one destina-
L	 tion can be processed at a . o ne, but the information flow rate can
be uaximized by proper coding an o.itching routines. A schematic
r	 representation of the model is given 4 n Figure 2.2. in this model
t:
5 is an information source, D is a destination, S- b l represent
the flow of the primary task information, 5 2--D2 represent the floe
"^	 16
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Fig. 2.2 Single Channel Multiplex Model
of the subsidiary task information.
Sri measuring operator workload it is assumed that, by appro-
priate motivation, priority is given to primary task information,
and that subsidiary task information is processed within the residual
channel capacity.
Some importanL requirements of the Gubsidiary task are AM--
strated by reference to this simple model:
1. The switching points at the input and at the output repre-
sent opportunities for task interference that must be minimized.
At the input end, priority must be given to the primary task.
Nonce, by appropriate motivation, the subject should perform the
subsidiary task only when he feels that he can respond with no
decrement in his performance on the primary task. It should be
noted here that in practice complete non-interference between the
subsidiary and pricey tasks is difficult to achieve. It should,
however, be minimized by using a subsidiary task which is different
in form from the primary task and which requires different effectors
at the output end.
2. The subsidiary task should be self-paced.
c
3. It has been mantioncd that information flow-rate #_h ough
the multiplex channel is a function of t3xe efficiency of th y: coding
18
J -
min:unized if a meaningful measure of the workload is to be obtained.
Consequently, the subsidiary task should be simple, thus requiring
very little learning, and the subject should be given an opportunity
to practice on the subsidiary task alone until he reaches steady
state on the learning curve. This yields the auded benefit of mini-
mizing inter-subject variations as the base performance for each
subject can be determined.
4. The subsidiary task information may occupy the channel
only in the absence of primary task information. This implies that
subsidiary task messages should be very short. This requirement
can by mat by using discrete stimulus-response units.
5. As mentioned above, the subsidiary task is used as a
measurement tool, to dete=*ne the operator's reserve capacity and
hence the portion of his total rapacity which is expended on the
primary task. As a measuring device, the scores of a given subsidiary
task should be comparable from situation to situation. In addition
to providing an average score over an entire run, in many applications
it is desirable for. the subsidiary task to provide an indication
of the instantaneous rate of flow of information continuously through-
2.4 The Subsidiary
As nentioned.in. Section 2.3, the subsidiary task is characterized
by the following features:
1. It is performed only when the subject feels that this
w"
 I not result in a decrement in his performance on the primary
task.
2. It involves psychoxrotor activity different from the primary
task's.
3. It is simple and over-learned.
4. It consists of short, discrete message units.
5. It can be scored continuously throughout an entire run,
and the information conveyed by the scores is comparable from situation
to situation.
Based on these required features, a "warning light" type subsidiary
task was selected for this research. It consisted of two small,
1/8" diameter red lights counted above each other outside the subject's
foveal vision and peripheral vision, and a rocker thumb .switch
mounted on the left horn of the control yoke.
The lights provided the stimuli. They were located 75 9 to
the right of the center of the flight instruments. The intensity
20
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of the lights was very low and was adjusted individually for each
subject via a variable resistance to ensure that the subject would
not be able to detect the lights in his peripheral vision. The
lights were mounted on a matte black background and the two-inch
distance between them subtended a relatively large visual angle
of 40 , to minimize confusion (see Figure 2.3).
During the run the upper or the lo'vvier light, with equal prob-
ability, was lit Lt random times for two seconds. A correct response
by the subject to this stimulus consisted of turning the light off
by a proper motion of the rocker thumb switch; that is, pushing
the switch: up if the upper light was on or pushing it dcrem if the
lower light was on.
A correct response by the subject caused the light to turn
off. A "hit" was scored and the subject's response-time stored.
In the absence of a correct response the light stayed on for two
seconds, then turned off and a "miss" was scored.. An incorrect
response by the subject (that is, pushing the switch the wrong way)
was also scored as a "miss".
After a Light was turned off, a time delay followed, uniformly
distributed between 0.5 and 5.0 seconds, and the process was then
repeated. V-:o time delay, as well as the selection of the light, was
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Figure 2.3 Subsidiary Task Warning Lights
22
f
rk.
controlled by a random number generator in the computer program.
F
The subject was instructed to consider the piloting task of
4	 flying an ILLS approach as his major concern at all times (see Appendix
B, "Instructiorn to Pilot -- Workload Measurement") . It was emphasized
that his primary concern should be to do the best that he could
flying the approach, and that he should resporid to the lights if and
only if he felt that he could do so without sacrificing his piloting
performance. To further impress upon the subject the importance
of the piloting task he was told that during the workload-measurem-ent
runs h,:^ did not have the option of executing a missed approach
and that each approach had to terminate in a touchda-,m on the runway
on the first trial.
A subsidiary task of this type has been shim to combine
sensitivity to workload changes with minimal de-rredation of primary
tracking task performance (Spyker et al., 1971). Thds point was
further substantiated in this study by subjective evaluation (see
Appendix C, "Pilot Questionnaire") as well as statistical analysis
of RMS tracking errors. These results are reported in detail in
Chapters III and 1V.
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2.5 Apparatus
For the purpose of this thesis, a simulation capability including
the ADAGC AGT/30 digital grarlaics computer and a fixed-base cockpit
simulator has been developed.
A mathematical model has been developed of a large transport
aircraft in the landing approach flight envelope. The actual flight
data of a DC-8 were used in the equations of motion (leper, 1969),
and the various parameters were later refined following a series
of flight tests by a senior airline captain with considerable Boeing
707/123 experience. Non-linear phenaniena surh as ground effect
and stalls have also been included. As an added assurance, the
simulator had been flown by cx-fighter pilots and airline captains
prior to conyrencement of the actual experimntation and all felt
that it was quite adequate.
An integrated-cue flight--director system has been designed
for this simulator, providing the capability of landing the simulated
aircraft manually an zero-zero conditions in a relatively satisfactory
manner. Also, a two-axis auto-pilot has been incorporated into the
simulation which is capable of flying IiS coupled approaches, in
either axis or in both axes, to touchdown. The autopilot and the
24
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flight-director systems have been tested extensively (see Figures
A.11--A.12) .
We also had the capability of addling wind disturbances to the
simulation to induce different workload levels. The wind nWes were:
1. No wince.
g	 2. 5 kt wind, gusting to 15 kz, from 260° (i.e., at 450
r
to the runway heading. Runway 4R at Logan Airport, whose heading
is 35^, was our active runway).
3. 10 kt wind, gusting to 30 kt fran 2600.
The gusts were modelled as faltered white noise with a cutoff frequency
of 7/6 rad/sec.
The equations of motion of the aircraft, as well as the flight-
director and autopilot systems, are described in detail in Appendix A.
The mathematical model was progrd into the AGI'/30 computer
which was linked via multiplexer channels and sense lines to the
cockpit simulator. The cockpit was a mock -up of the captain's
crew station in a Boeing transport aircraft (see Figure 2.4). The
windows were fzrosted to eliminate external visual reference.
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Figure 2.4 Cockpit S.irnulawr -- General View
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The controls included an operational, spring-centered control
column with a control wheel and rudder pedals, as well as four
throttles, flaps, speed-brake and landing gear levers, and flight-
director and autopilot controls.
Apart from engine instruments and marker Macon lights, the
simulator was equippad with three CPT screens, mounted one each
on he irai.n insti mr.nt panels at the captain's and the first office'r's
stations and one in p1jce of the weather radar screen. The screens
were driven siraultan- !oiisly by the ADAM caniautcr. The screens on
the main panels prescnt.ad six standard flight instruments (see Figure
2.5) : ak __d, at.titudn--flight director iirti.cator, altim-ter,
instantaneous vertical spoed indicator, horizontal situation (HSI)
and radio magnetic WNI) indicators, as well as a DME digital readout
and a glideslq?, deviation needle which was repeated on the attitude
indicator and the NISI. Tho HSI included a course deviation line which
was tuned to the localizer. The RMI needles were tuned to the outer
compass locator and to the Boston VCR station (see also Figure A.3)
One of our goals in this study was to investigate the pilot's
failure detection performance based on his internal model of the
environment and on his capability of processing raw flight data.
Consequently, we did not include any displays of a mode progress
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annunciator, movable bugs or a fault annunciator panel, nor were
there any warning flags.
The CRT screens were driven by the ocxnpster at a rate of 24
frames per second which was sufficient to produce flicker--free
images. The images were updated at a rate of 5/second.
2.6 N-easuremei-its
Throughout each run continuous measurements were taken on-line
by the canputer program. 'These veasurema-its were stored initially
a
in memory buffers; at the end of the run they were written on disk
a
and on magnetic tape as data files for subsequent off-line analysis.
2.6.1 Flight Data
During an approach, the airplane's spatial coordinates, i.e.,
the distance from the runway threshold, the distance from the localizer
course (runway centerline) and the altitude were sanpled at constant
1-.ime antj_-~rals and stored. The sampling intervals were set at 5
seconds initially and at one second at altitudes below 150 feet,
where aircraft responses of higher frequencies were expected during
the flare or go-around maneuvers. 'These date enabled us to reconstruct
30
the flight path and to estirreLte derivatives, such as velocity and
sink rate, which we could not store directly due to nary Limitations.
At touchdawn (i.e., when altitude equals zero) pertinent
quantities were sampled and stored. They are:
1. distance from, threshold
2. distance from centerline
3. airspeed
4. sink rate
5. pitch angle
6. bank angle
7. heading
8. crab angle	 9
These data allecred us to assess the acceptability of the
landings. A landing as considered successful if it satisfied allg
of the following requirements (Gainer et al., 1967):
Ii
I.
a^
1	 .
1
1. range - first 3000 feet of the 7500-foot runway
2. centerline - f 75 feet
3. airspeed - less than 135 kt
4. sink rate - less than 360 fpm
5. pitch - between 0' and 90
31
6. bank - less than 50 left or right
7. heading - within 4° of runway heading, i.e., between
31° and 390
There were no penalties for excessive crab, i.e., lateral drift,
as the pilot was not presented with any decrab information.
In addition to these, time to detection of failures, when a
failure occurred, was also recorded. A detection was inn ica:ed by
pressing a push-button located on the center console in the cockpit.
2.6.2 Workload Data
When it was activated, the pilot's performance on the subsidiary
warning-light task was monitored on-line. Data were recorded in real
tirre throughout the run and stored in wry, to be written on
disk and on magnetic tape at the end of the run as data files.
Specifically, the program recorded the number of times that
the subject responded correctly to the warning light by ­,i  va-l-ing
the thurrtb switch ("hits"), his response time (latency) and the
X -coordinate of the aircraft, i.e., the distance fran the runway
threshold at the time of the response. This last measure enabled us
to correlate the subject's workload with the altitude via the recorded
Y
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flight-path data. The distance frets threshold was recorded, rather
than the actual altitude, as it was conceivable that the aircraft
would fly at a constant altitude or pass through an altitude more
than once, while it was improbable that a pilot would be more than
once at amy given 0-coordinate, that is, T-'y , a course at an angle
of 90 or more fron the runway heading.
incorrect responses by the pilot, that is, not responding
to an illuminatod light or activating the switch the wrong way,
were counted and labolled as "misses". The X -coordinates corresponding
to the "misses" were also recorded and stored. r
A workload index was computed from these data as follows:
1. As each stimulus was presented for 2 seconds, the total
response-time ratio, RTR, for both "hits" and "misses" was computed by
cumulative latency Q Ti)
R`I`R -
	
	
z	
---	 (2.2 )
Total number of stimuli x 2 sec
2. A miss rate MR was computed by
j
14R NaWber of stimuli missed	 (2.3)Total nurJjer of stimuli
i
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3. A workload index WLX was then extracted using the best
I least squares fit weighting coefficients
VEX
i
_ 0.780 RTR + 0.625 MR
r 0.780 + 0.626 x 100 percent	 (2.4)
This measure of workload has been shoran (Spyker et a7.., 1971) to
be correlated with physiological predictor} of workload with a
correlation coefficient p = 0.645, significant at the p < 0.005
l vel ;
For the purpose of correlating failure detection performance
i
with workload levels, subject responses between altitudes of 2000
feet and 800 feet were used in coigDuti.ng the workload index because
i
between these altitudes the aircraft was stabilized on the approach
path and because failures occurred only in this region. Also, we
wished to eliminate differences betiieen subjects which may have been
caused by different. subjects assigning different relative priorities
to the primary  tracking task and the subsidiary task. To this end
the workload index of each subject was normalized, that is, a workload
index of zero was assigned to the approach which resulted in the
laaest workload measure for each subject and a workload index of
100 was assigned to the approach with the highest workload measuref	 '„
for each subject. The normalized workload index on approach i of
34
subject j was computed by
min
Normalized WLX..	 i rqiII 
7',7	
x 100 percent	 (2.5)
"'Inxij 	 Ji {VffX,i 
2.7 Expm--iimntal Design
'1,111
	
-imental variables to be investigated in this study
were the pi-L, s participation level in the pilotin g task, the
workload ind'-icpd by the control dynamics and by external disturbances,
and the pilot's failure detection performnce.
The experianent involved four levels of participation:
1. "Passive monitoring", with autopilot coupling ii-i all
axes, including autothrottles.
2. "Control yaw", with autopilo t coupling in the pitch axis
and autotl-irottle coupled.
J.3. "Control pitch", with autopilot coupling in the yaw
axis only.
4. "Control both", i.e., a fully-manual approach.
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There were three levels of wind disturbance:
1. No wind.
2. A 450 tailwind of five knots, gusting to fifteen knots.
3. A 45° tailwind of ten knots, gusting to thirty knots.
Three failure conditions were used:
i
1. No failure.
2. Failure in the yaw axis (see Section A.4). In this condition
the autopilot, if coupled, or the flight director would steer the
airplane away from the localizes course, resulting in a one-dot
deviation (1.250 of angular error) about 100 seconds after the
failure occurred. This type of failure was chosen, rather than a
runaway failure, because it was quite subtle and so provided a
good masure of the limits of the pilot's failure-detection capability.
3. Failure in the pitch axis, which resulted in a one-dot
deviation (0.350 of angular error) approximately 30 seconds after
the occurrence of the failure (see Figure A.11')
Failures were presented only between the altitudes of 1800 and 800
feet. The selection of the failure altitude was randomized, as was
the selection of the direction of the failure (left-right in a yaw
failure viode, up-down in a pitch failure mode). workload levels
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and failure detection performance were investigated in separate
experiments, to avoid possible contamination of failure detection
data by t[-ie presence of a concani.tant subsidiary task. Also, we
were interested in measuring workloads at the different participation
levels. The occurrence of a failure during the approach would have
made this impossible, as the control mode changed following a failure.
2.7.1 workload
The effects of the level of participation and of the wind
disturbance on the pilot's workload were investigated in a 4 x 3
factorial experiment as shown schematically in Figure 2.6.
The order of presentation of the twelve treatncnts was randomized,
and every pilot (replication) flew all twelve approaches indicated
by the design. The subject's workload level was measured by the sub-
sidiary task. No failures were presented and go-arounds were not
permitted.
2.7.2 Failure Detection
The effects of the level of participation and of the wind
disturbance on the pilot's failure detection performance Caere inves-
tigated in a 4 x 3 x 2 factorial experiment as sh=-1 schemtic.a lly
in Figure 2.7.
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The "no failure" condition was also incorporated in the design
so that the subject would not anticipate a failure on each and every
approach. This, however, resulted in a 4 x 3 x 3 = 36 treatments
per replication for this experiment in addition to the twelve treat-
ments of the workload experiment. We felt that such a large number
of treatmants placed an unacceptable burden on the volunteer subjects.
Consequently, some high-level interactions were partially confoumded
in the failure detection experimental design {Cochran and Cox, 1968;
Li, 1955), resulting in eighteen treatments per subject (replication).
With the workload index experiment, this meant 30 treatments in
all per subject, which we felt was a more manageable load. The
interactions which were partially confounded were (participation) x
(failure! and (participation) x (disturbance) x (failure). The average
loss of informtcion regarding these interactions was 1/27 and 4/27,
respecta.vc ly (Li, 1944) , cured to a full rank design; that is,
the acc :_L ct: _es of the estimates of these effects were 26/27 and 23/27,
respectively, of the accuracy of the estimates of the non-confounded
effects. The treatments presented to each subject, excluding the
six approaches in which no failures occurred, are shown in Table 2.1.
The subsidiay task was not presented in this part of the experiment
and go"arounds weir permitted.
The order of presentation of the twelve trea.trents was ranJomizc :;.
Each pilot flew the twelve approaches indicated by the design, failures
39
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Table 2.1 Treatments of Failure Detection Experiment
Treatment {ijk} participation mode i
disturbance level j
failure condition k
REPLICATION (SUBJECT)
2b	 3a 3b 4a	 4b 5a	 5b	 6a	 6b	 7a
001 000 001 001 000 001 000 000 001 000
010 010 011 010 011 010 Oil 010 Oil Oil
021 021 020 020 021 021 020 021 020 021
101 100 101 100 101 100 101 101 100 101
110 110 ill 111 110 ill 110 ill 110 110	 g
121 121 120 121 120 120 121 120 121 120
200 201 200 200 201 200 201 201 200 200
211 211 210 211 210 211 210 211 210 211
220 220 221 221 220 220 221 220 221 221
300 301 300 301 300 301 300 300 301 301	 f
311 311 310 310 311 310 311 310 311 310
320 320 321 320 321 321 320 321 320 320
40
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1 (continued)
REPLICATION (SUBJECT)
7b	 8a	 8b	 9a	 9b
001 000 001 001 000
010 Oil 010 Oil 010
020 020 021 020 021
100 101 100 100 101
111 110 111 110 ill
121 121 120 121 120
201 200 201 201 200
210 211 210 211 210
220 220 221 220 221
300 301 300 330 301
311 310 311 310 311
321 321 320 321 320
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were presented and the pilot's detection performance was monitored.
Each pilot flew six additional approaches in which no failure occurred.
These approaches were randomly interspersed among the twelve failure
approaches. No failure detection data were obtained from these approaches,
of course, but recoils of these runs were kept for identification
of possible loading effects of the subsidiary task, when present,
by means of analysis of variance of RMS tracking errors.
The data which were obtained in these experiments were processed
off-line by a package of statistical computer programs, UCLA BMD.
The methods of analysis are described in detail in Chapter IV of this
thesis.
2.8 Procedure
2.8.1 Familiarization and Training
Each pilot was first briefed in general terms about the
purpose of this research, and after he filled out a personal data
questionnaire (Appendix C) he proceeded to the simulator.
The subject was familiarized with the instruments and with
the various controls, levers and switches. He was sham an approach
plate for runway 4R at Logan on which the initial aircraft position
42
1	 ..
and heading were indicated by an arraw (Figure 2.$), and the approach
procedures were explained to him: the subject was told that all
approaches began at the same position, 12 miles from the runway threshold,
one mile to the left of the localizar course and heading of 065°,
at altitude 2500 feet and airspeed 170 KIAS, with the landing gear
up and flaps set at 300. lie was to capture and t°ack the ILS approach
path, la.,ier the flaps to 400 when the ylideslope deviation indicator
needle started moving dr.A,,7n and call for the landing gear and for full
flaps (500) when passing through altitude of 2000 feet. It was made
clear to the subject that, as pilot-in-corrmand, he could deviate
from, these guidelines at his mm discretion. The experirmanter
was to act as a co-pilot and operate the flaps and the landing gear.
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T,ie autopilot was then coupled, the flight director was
turned off and biased out of view, and the subject observed a fully
automatic coupled approacd-i to touchdowm. The exTerimenter, in the
co-pilot's seat, called out the following events: localizer alive,
glideslope alive, 2000 feet, outer marker, 1000 feet, middle marker,
and threshold passage (inner marker). These calls were made on all
subsequent approaches.
At touchdown the CRT s=ee-1 blanked out for one second and
then a list was displayed (Figure 2.9) indicating to the pilot
the parameters at touchdown.
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Next, the lateral autopilot was uncoupled, the flight director
was turned on in the roll (LOC) mode, and the pilot flew a split-
axis approach, in which he controlled the aircraft in yaw and in
f
roll, to touchdc Fan. The thud familiarization approach was a split-
I
axis control in pitch in which the pilot was, for the first time,
in control of the power, followed by a fully manual approach.
11he subject continued to fly fully manual approaches until
he indicated that he was satisfied with his perfonnnce or until
he flew at least tcn approaches which terminated in a successful
touchdcxvn, which ever occurred later. This ended the training period.
The actual expe_r_inental runs then comm-'nced. The experiment
consisted of two separate sessions, with each pilot flying fourteen
approaches in the first session and sixteen approaches in the second
session. Seven pilots flew the workload approaches first, followed
by the failure detection runs; the order was reversed for the other
eight subjects. This was done to counter-balance any possible
learning effects.
Each approach lasted between five and six minutes; the first
session usually lasted for about three hours, including one 20-
minute break. The second session was conducted about a week or
two weeks after the first, and also started with a re-training
45
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period. Generally less practice was required, howevexr to reach
a plateau on the learning curve and the second session ?asted for
about two hours, including the 20--minute break..
f'
2.8 ,2 Tnrarkload Pxperin-ent
The subject was instructed in the use of the subsidiary task
(see Appendix B. 1), and it was emphasized to him that his primary
concern at all timas should be to do the best that he could on the
primary task (flying the approach). To further impress upon the subject
the priority of the primary task he was told that he could not elect
to execute a missed approach and that each and every approach should
te-iminate in a touchdmrn on the first triad.. The brightness of the
subsidiary task's warning lights was then adjusted by the experimenter
with the subject looking at the attitude indicator, until the subject
reported that he could not detect the Lights in his peripheral vision.
The twelve experimental rums for the record then c=renced. At the
end of this session, the subj% :t was asked to answer a subjective
evaluation questionnaire. (see Appendix C).
2.8.3 Failure Detection
Instructions concerni ng the general characteristics of Lhis
experiment were read to the pilot (Appendix B.2). He was told tliat
as soon as he detected conflicting readings or discrepancies between
instrmnalts he should call it out as a failure and specify the axis
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in which he suspected tl.-ie failure occurred, such as "roll failure",
"lateral malfunction", "drifting off the localizer" and the like.
This was done to assure that the pilot detected an actual failure
and was not reporting a false alcu-m which may have resulted from a
sudden gust or a vertical draft.
The pilot was told that leas reaction time would be recorded
by way of the experimenter pressing a button on the center console.
The experimenter held his hand over the button throughout the approach
on every approach, including the ones in which no failure was to occur,
to minimize delay--times and to avoid cueing the subject inadvertently.
The pilot was told that folkwing a correct identification,
Ethe malfunctioning system would be disconnected by the experimenter
^i	 and it would be up to him to decide whether to continue the landing
or to execute a missed approach, whi d-i consisted of calling for a i
go-around and establishing a positive rate-of-climb, at which point
}F	 the run was teLmi.nated by the experimenter.
(tl
(t^
S^
FAA regulations or company policy concerning the tex-mi.nation
of an approach were not to be adhered to. The pilots were to use
^	 3
thus crvm judgement, the decision--criterion being the probability
of an acceptable landing. If they thought that they could complete 	 n
i
the landing following a malfunction, the pilots were to . do so;
,fig t
.^	 _	 ^
if, in their judgement, an acceptable touchdown was precluded,
they were to initiate a go-around.
The flight-director operated only in the axes wl-dch were
controlled manually. The matrix of control mcdes fol-lowing a failure
is given in Table 2.2.
2.9 Pilot Subjects
A total of twenty qualified pilots. participated in this research.
Of these, four pilots - two airli-ne captains and two DnT personnel -
assisted in the preliminary phases of simal.ator validation, flight
parameters adjustment, and experinental procedures shakedown runs.
Of the rmaining sixteen pilots, one dropped out of the program
after one session for personal reasons and fifteen pilots from Delta
Airlines and Eastern Airlines -- seven capta-Lis, six first officers
and two second officers - flew 450 approaches for the formal experi-
ments. These pilots' personal data are suRnarized in Table 2.3.
^g	 All of the pilots were volunteers who had an interest in the
FAILURE
Autopilot	 Flight Director
Fully Automatic Autopilot disconnected,
flight--director coupled
in failed axis
crkC)	
Split Axis	 Autopilot disconnected,	 Flight-director disconnected,
flight-director coupled	 pilot reverts to raw data in
in failed axis	 failed axis
FLIGHT EXPERIENCE, HOURS FLIGHT.
COMMERCIAL MILITARY OTHER DIRECTORS
PILOT AGE POSITION CURRENTEQUIP. JET RECIP. JET RECIP. CP RB	 0	 ij
2b 38 F10 DC-9 5000 1500 1500 'I
3a 56 Captain B727 5000 15000 2000 550
3b 32 Captain B727 4000 1000 2000 /
as 33 F/0 B727 2200 300 550
cn
4b 39 Captain DC-9 5000 5000 ,l /
5a 41 F/0 B727 3300 250 J ^^
5b 62 Capt(ret) DC--9 7000 18000 5000 1200
6a 55 Captain B727 9500 16500 1500 850 3 V/
6b 35 S/O B727 400 1500 150 500
7a 32 F/0 Electra 300 2000 1000 250
z
7b 40 Captain DC-9 5500 3500
8a 30 S/0 B727 1000 1500 300 400
8b 32 Captain B727 5000 3000
9a 28 F/0 B727 300 600 3300 J
9b 3 1 F/0 B727 4000 350 V^
Mean 39 3800 7400 1300 1600 1800
^'CPWcross-painters (Sperry); RB=roll-bars (Collins); O=other (Litton)
#r'equipment
._	 ......
flown . prior to retirement
,
1	 '	 t	 I	 I
The total flight experience of the pilots who participated
in the experimental phase of the research ranged from 2,550 hours
to 31,200 hours, with a median of 6,000 hours. Twelve pilots had
accumulated 10,000 hours or less, with a median of 4,200 hours;
three pilots had more than 22,000 hours each, with a mean of
28,350 hours.
This experience had been accunul.ated in connercial jets such
as B707, B727, DC8, DC9, FH227 and CV860; reciprocating com-ercial
aircraft such as DC3, DC4, DC5, DC6, DC7, CV240, CV340 and CV440;
military jets such as F4, A6, T33 and T37; militaiy propellor-driven
aircraft such as 0-1, T41, T42 and an assortmnt of World [far Il
aircraft; and various light fixed- and rotary-wing airplanes.
All pilots, with one exception, had had. experience with integrated-
	 ;=
cue flight directors such as the Collins ED105 and FD109. With the
exception of subject 5b, all pilots had flown numerous ITS approaches
in the six-month period i mdiately preceeding the first experimantal
session, the most recent IIS approach having been within two weeks
F'
E
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3.1 Description of the Records
CHAPTER III
DATA AND RESULTS
Data were accumulated during each run and throughout the run.
They were initially stored in arrays in the computer's memory; at
touchdown, which automatically terminated the run, or when the
experimenter manually terminated the run after initiation of a
missed approach, all the data of that run were copied into data 	 ,j
files and stored on a disk. At the end of a session, all the data
files of that session were also copied onto magnetic tapes. In all,
about 1500 data files were accumulated.
The m-asurements which were taken on-line are reported in
f1}
RUN CODA JH113
.	 t PARAMETERS AT TOUCHDOWN OR AT STOPACTIOW
^.F
DISTANCE FROM THRESHOLD 1936, FT.
-. DISTANCE FROM CEPTEFLIN£ -88. FT.
i INDICATED AIRSPEED 127. KNOTS
1t VERTICAL SPEED -143. FPM.
PITCH ANGLE	 6. D£GS.
BANK ANGLE	 1. D£GS.
HEADING	 36.	 DEGS.
CRAB At?GLE
	 0.	 DEGS.
.! t TIME TO . DETECT	 0 . 00	 SECS,
TIME TO IDENTIFY	 0. 00 SECS.
f
j
E 1 •
c
i
t
YI
i °
f
}Z-
r
rr
5 ^
i^
55
F
Figure 3.1	 Sample Output Record
(Continued on next 4 pages)
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75 SMPLES OF SPATIAL COORDINATES FOLLOW'
_.. 1 ELAPSED TIME,SECS, X,FEET A, FEET
0.008 -71807, 2500.
5.203 -70505. 2496.
j 10.008 -69297. 2495.
I 15.058 -68032, 2494.
20.108 -6675". 2494.
25.008 -65513. 2495.
30.058 -64204, 2492.
35.108 -62862. 2489.
40.158 -61492. 2488.
45.009 -60138. 2488.
50.059 -58701. 2485.
55.109 -57249, 2481.
" - 60.159 -55796. 2475,
:. 65.009 -54440. 2475.
70.059 -53114. 2471.
75.110 -51806. 2469,
10.210 -50473, 2472.
85.060 •-4920. 2464.
90.160 -47874. 2426.
95.010 -46612. 2371.
100.060 -45297. 2318.
105.161 -43999. 2275.
110.011 -42689. 2242.
115.011 -413£6. 21.1?2.
120,111 -40066. 2120.
125.161 -38769. 2046.
130.011 37522.
135.110 -36207. 1934.
140.210 -34953. 1890.
145,009 -33897• 1819.
IS0.lU9 -3276$. 1735.
i3 195.053 -31676. 1c•69•
160.157 -30556, 1619.
165.007 -29474. 1582.
170,106 -22319. 1554.
175.006 -27205. 15£2.
180.105 -26044. 1458.
185.284 -24875. 1382,
190.054 -23754. 1315.
195.203 -22556. 1261.
200.052 -21445. 1210.
. 205.152 -20286. 1149.
210	 051 -•19141 1079
Y. FEET
-6079.
^5319.
-4+16.
-387£.
-31c0^
-2379.
-1681.
-1080.
-547.
274,
492.
501.
440. i
405.
343,
289.
243.
224.
267.
312. i
350. .,.	 1349.
312.
216,
152.
y9.
-15.
-54.
-9.
16.
4' 4 .
92
156.
203. z
197.
167. i	
.
121. i
215.151 -t$O5S. 1000. 74.
220.200 -16930. 933. 41.
s 225.099 -15830. 885. 23.
230.199 -14690. $41.
i 235.048 -13607. 791. 11
240.147 --12470, 727. 12.
245.197 -11348, 659. 0.
iI
-9
I
l 250.046 -10274, 592.	 -6.
255.145 -9142. 529.	 -1I.
250.245
-0013. 474.	 -15.
265.094 -6939. 424.	 -13.
270.144
-5818, 370.
275.243 -4681. 314.	 11.
is 230.092 -3599. 259.	 5.j'
285.192 -2467. 197.	 -2.
..^+
289.191 -1563. 149,	 '-27. -f
290.091
-1384. 138.	 -33.
291.191 -1141. I26.	 -41.
" 292.091 -942. 115.	 -48.
293.191 -699. 102,	 -57.
294.091 -500. 92.	 -6.4.
295.190 -258. 79.	 73.
296.090 -60. 69,	 -80, E
297.190 IE2. 56.	 -89. j
2?8.090 380. O.S.	 -94. Ji
299.190 622. 33.	 -99.
{( 300.090 320. 25.	 -102, i
1i 301.190 1062. 16.	 -102.
302.090 12£0. 10.
303.189 1501. 5.	 -99.
304.029 1699. 2.	 -94.
305.189 1936. 0.
] i
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t 1 29 CORRECT RESP014SES FOLLOUI,
Y„FEE=T
	
RESPONSE T,
	 ES C.
y-70013.940	 1.950
-68357.560	 2.000
-67100.440	 0.850
-66200.750
	
1.100
^68210.030	 1.750
.
t -57939.340	 1.750
-54917.4.10	 1.350
-54266.280	 1.300 9
-50538.250	 11300
-^ -47704.720
	
0 .900
-37639.$45
	
1.550
-36:?2E.?15	 1.300
-35192.125	 1.100
' -32514.126	 1.350
(! -30212.923	 1 . 100
.•} -275I2.360	 1.750
-• 25082.132	 1.550
-23695.419	 1.600
-20488.569
	
1.750
p -15729.657	 1.800
-14500.133	 1.750 f
-12325.117	 0.650
i -9925.V36	 1.Ssa
'	 ! •-7625.F30	 1.350 f
f -6251.277	 1.840
-5337.676
	
1.750
''	 4
:3 -39C9.5S+2	 I.350
' -2%54.590	 0 .900
^I
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38 I14CORRECT RESPONSES FOLLOW:
X.FEET
-64947.3
-•61422.9
-54599.7
-56355.6
-54561.9
-53114.0
-520.27.2
-X18745.5
-46729.0
-45518.7
-44248.4
-43264.7
-41940.9
--40919.0
-397$2.0
1	
-38371.]
-33897.2
-29417.$
'	 -228313.8
1	 -26852.9 r
-25659.9 j
-24471.2 i
-22154.6
f	 -21090.9
-19592.0
99
;	 7
-18946.7
-1776:•4
tia
-16424.7 i
€	
-13462.3
-11591.8 a
j	 -10805.4
-8456.3
I	 -4 580 .6 i
-1726.4
^	
--80 2 . !
622.0
1259.7
r
F
f t
7
I
I
1
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S
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the 15 subjects, segregated by participation level, are shown in
r
Figures 3.2-3.5; those of the normalized workload scores are shown
in Figures 3.6-3.9.
s	 z`
r
The non--normalized workload scores ranged fzan 28.6 to 100.0;
the normalized scores ranged from 0.0 to 100.0. Normalized workload
scores as a functirn of the gusts' ,_trength are she an. in Figure 3.10,
and as a function of the participation mode - in Figure 3.11.
TAb were also interested in the tim-variations in the instant-
aneous workload levels. To this end, <ti7orkload data were segregated
by participation modes; man scores were extracted at 300-feet
altitude intervals between the altitudes of 2000 and 500 feet, and 	 ~i
P	 g
at 100-feet intervals between 500 feet and touchdown. The results,
averaged over all pilots, are shown in Figures 3.12 through 3.15.
.;}
A measuren-ent of each subject's evaluation of the primary and
secondary task difficulty was included in our study. The questionnaire
which was used (Appendix C) had four multiple-choice questions
related to the overall difficulty of the primary task and two questions
on the difficulty f the secondaryz  task. Points were assigned for
j	 each answer on a zero--to-ten Cooper rating scale (Figure 3.16) i with
10 indicating the greatest difficulty (Cooper and Harper, 1969)..
yy
	 This was the same type of questionnaire that had been used in a pilot
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Normalized Workload Index at Two
Disturbance Levels
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D1 - Calm Air
D2 - 10 kt. Wind, Gusting to 30 kt.
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sworkload istudy conducted by Spyker et aZ. (1971). The results are
shc%m in Figures 3.17--3.22.
L _:
3.3 Detection Performance
Detection performance was analyzed in terms of detection-time
and accuracy. Detection-titer was defined as the elapsed time between{
the occurrence of a failuxt. and the verbal report by the subject that
s'
the failure has been detected; the subject also report&d the failure-
axis to insure that he reported a bona-fide failure and not a false
:-
	
	 alarm. Detection-tim~ results are presented in Figures 3.23-3.25 for
longitudinal failures and in Figures 3.26--3.28 for lateral failures.
Accuracy was measured by the fraction of failures that were
missed altogether. he differentiated between approaches in which a
failure went unreported but which resulted in a successful touchdown
of in an error at touchdown which was unrelated to the failure .(such
as excessive bank, following a longitudinal failure), and approaches
in which a failure was missed and which did not terminate in a
successful landing because of a gross error in the failed axis. The
latter are shown in Table 3.1 and 3.2; the nunbers in Var-entheses
represent the fraction of all missed failures, whether or not they
resulted in a successful landing.
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Hitch Failure Detection Times at Four
Participation Modes
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Participation Modes
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Table 3.1
Fraction of Missed Longitudinal Failures
in percent of all longitudinal failures (in parentheses)
^	 3
and in percent of missed alarms resulting in gross
deviations in failed axis
disturbance	 Level
Participation Overall
Mode 1 2 3
Monitor 0. 0. 0. 0.
Control Yaw 0. 0. 0. 0.
Control. Pitch 12.5 0. 12.5 8.7
(12.5) (14.3) (12.5) (13.0)
Manual Control 0. 14.3 37.5 17.4
(12.5) (14.3) (37.5) (21.7)
Overall 3.3 3.3 13.3 G.7
(6.7) (6.7) (13.3) (8.9)
fr	 ^
f
Table 3. 2
Fraction of Missed Lateral Failures
9jin percent of all lateral failures (in parentheses)
I
and in percent of missed alarms resulting in gross
deviations in failed axis
t
Disturbance
	
Level
Participation Overall
Mode 1 2 3
Monitor 0. 0. 0. 0.
Control Yaw 25.0 14.3 12.5 17.4
(37.5) (14.3) (37.5) (30.4)
Co:ttro1 Pitch 0. 0. 0. 0.
Manual Control 14.3 0. 14.3 9.1
(14.3) (14.3) (9.1)
Overall 10.0 3.3 6.7 6.7
(13.3) (3.3) (13.3) (10.0)
i
I	 l--J--J __l	 l	 I ^77I	 11pi
in all, 90 approaches were flown in which a longitudinal failure
occurred; of these, eight went unreported, six of which slid not
terminate in a successful landing. Of the 90 lateral failures pre-
sented, nine were missed; of these, six did not terminate in a
successful. touchdown.

} r 15 0 Iay =	 1.9
,t
a	 W 60.
3" I 	
46.4yl
.zi —
C
^- 100
... ..,
-	
-
d z
3. CY
LLJ...
[ ^ t
50
JI
i1r 1 S	 ^_ 	 d
-3	 -2	 --1	 0 l	 2.
3i
DISTANCE FROM CENTERLINE, 	 FEET X 10r2 ":.
f
Fig.	 3.30 Distance From Centerline at.Touchdown
(Frequency is shown in quantum steps of 3)
89
100	 120	 140	 160
INDICATED AIRSPEED, KNOTS
U
z
LEJ
d
Lli
ry
LL.
r
200
150
z
Uj
o' 100
50
r
-12
	
	 °-9	 --G	 3	 0
VERTICAL VELOCITY, FEET PER MINUTE X 10_2
Pig. 3.32 Vertical Velocity at Touchdown
(Frequency is shown in quantum steps of 4)
F'
i
-	
91 I
11	
= r.10
!.04°
^i
:i
L)
z
W
CY
i tJ
0.e
LL
r
1---.-1	 1=---1	 I	 1.	 i	 I
200	 0	 00.4	 2.0
iI 0 02.4 0.1.
1A
150
a 100
LU
LL
50
F-I F-I
R
V"-14	 -12	 -10	 -8	 -6	 -4	 -2	 0	 2	
4	 6	 8	 10	 12
• BANK ATTITUDE,
	
DEGREES
Fig. 3.34	 Bank Attitude 
at Touchdown
(rrequency is shown in quantum steps of 4)
93
I	 1	 I	 L	 1 .7 I,--I
F
r
U
Z
W
CY
W
LL..
Fj
3.5 Tracking Performance
95
As the time-histories of the spatial coordinates of the
simulated aircraft during each approach were available (Section 3.1),
it was possible to compute angular root--mean-square vector tracking
errors. We chose to document tracking performnce in angular, rather
than linear, RMS errors as only angular information was available to
the pilot from the localizer- and glideslope-deviation indicators.
The data of RMS errors were computed between the altitudes of
2000 and 900 feet for the approaches in vh-Lich no failure occurred.
Men a failure was simulated, RMS errors were computed between 2000
feet and the point of failure occurrence. Crass-track angular RN,S
errors are shown in Figure 3.36 as fractions of a full-scale deviation
(5°); angular RMS errors in the vertical plane are shown as fractions
of a full.-scale deviation (1.4°) in Figure 3.37.
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4.1 Wbrkload
We were cognizant of the fact that our workload-measuring
side-task may have caused undesired loading of the sub"ects, and
hence, that the piloting performance results obtained in the workload
measurement e%perunt and the data obtained in the runs When the
side-task was not present care from different populations. '.-Lbis
possibility was carefully investigated. It has been sho-an Melley,
1966) that the most precise piloting performance measure is RMS
tracking error; consequently, RMS tracking-error data of the work-
load measuring experin-ent Caere compared with RMS data obtained from
the failure detection experiment, on approaches in which no failure
occur:, _. Analysis of variance revealed that the iiypotiiesis t1--at
the data represented the sane population could not be rejected
(Table 4.1). It was concluded, therefore, that the side-task did
not cause any significant loading of the pilots and that the work-
load scores which were obtained during the workload measurement runs
Caere applicable to the failure detection, no-side-tusk approaches.
It seemd clear from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 that the side-task
scores were sensitive to variations both in the disturbance level and
in the participation mode. Indeed, analysis of variance under the
hypothesis that the effects were additive revealed that the variations
j	 {
7	 !
°i
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F Table 4.1	 ANOVA of RMS Tracking Errors
'
dk
13 Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F
I
1 Mean 45974.99 1 45974.99 459.3*
^,
Replications 2791.99 14 199.43 2.0
f
' `_'rea tments : f
Participation Mode 4201.48 3 1400.49 14.0*
Disturbance Level 6197,89 1 6197.88 61.9
Presence or Absence
`
of side--task 318.20 1 318.20 3^2
4c
^^
Error 25023.09 250 100.09
`{
* - Significance at the 19. level
3
7	 '
Table 4.2	 ANOVA of Normalized Workload Scores
ft
4 I	 i
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F
Mean. 457561.50 1 457561.50 893.2*
Replications 15019.85 14 1072.85 2.1
Treatments:
' Participation Mode 79507.92 3 265:2.64 51.7:
Disturbance Level 3868.10 2 1934.05 3.8
f
- Error 81966.42 160 512.29
100{
3 scores as a function of participation mode were significant
0.01 level., and as a function of the severity of the
-- at the P < 0.05 level. (Table 4.2) .
eras, however, no significant difference between workloads
wind of 5 knots, gusting to 15 knots. It was asswned, and it was
verified by pilots 	 convents, that the components of the wind normal
and parallel to the final approach flight-path (3.5 knots gusting to
10.6 ]cizots) were not strong enough to induce workloads significantly
higher than those induced by piloting the simulated aircraft in calm
air. Consequently, these two disturbance levels were combined in the
i` analysis and the data were txeated as if there were only two distinct
i!
disturbance levels, "low" and "high".
An additive model was used in the regression of workload scores
on disturbance levels and participation modes:
3
W(P,D) = W, (P) + W2 (D)= WO + Wp (P) + Wd (D)	 (4.1_a)	 f
where w is the workload score
7 P is the participation node
^E
D is the disturbance level 	 i
and Wd are the partial derivatives M/aP and W/M,	 3P
j respectively
and WO is the baseline workload score.
101	 F
Using this model, Wl (P) and W2 (D) were found to hG
0.0 for the lai disturbance level
W20
9.8 for the high disturbance level
18.7 for the fully automatic mode
36.6 for the split-axis, yaw-manual mdeWl (P)
61.0 for the split--axis, pitch-manual made
72.9 for the fully-manual mcde 	 F '
These values yielded workload-participation mode correlation_	 3
significant at P < 0.001 and workload--disturbance level correlation
1
significant at P < 0.05. 	 j
i
Figures 3.12 through 3.15 reveal the asymptotic altitude behavior
of the pilot's workload: The workload is essentially constant at
altitudes higher than approximately 500 feet, but there is a very 	 }.;
r - ^marked ir_creasY., in the workload at lower altitudes. Undoubtedly, this
increase is at least partially due to the non-linear increase in
display sensitivity with decreasing distance-to-go. However, this
increase in pilot workload was observed even when the pilot acted as
102
111 	
it
a monitor and the autopilot controlled the ai-rcraft, which seems to
indicate the effect of other factors as well; sloclZ as, possibly, the
pilot's rental state arising from his awareness of the proximity of
the ground. It is conceivable that optimal display design may reduce
the additional workloads i pposed on the pilot as a result of the
increased display sensitivity; further studies are necessary, hcwever,
to find out whether these other factors, if any, are inherent in the
situation or whether a reduction is possible in the pilot's workload
during the last phase of a landing approach.
4.2 Trackinq Performance
FigL.-es
 
3.36 and 3.37 show the vertical and lateral RMS tracking
errors, respectively, averaged over all subjects and over all wind-
disturbance levels. It is clear that our subjects were capable of
tracking the ILS glade-path within less than 10% of full-scale GSI
deflection. Localizer tracking performance was even better, and the
largest raean RMS error is approximately 5% of full-scale CDI deflection.
The dii.erence between lateral and longitudinal tracking performance
may be due partially to the larger size of 	 course deviation
indicator instiimnnnt, as compared to the glide-slope deviation indicator,
and partially to the difference in the difficulty of controlling the
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simulated aircraft in the longitudinal and lateral axes: Longitadinal
control., requiring the coordination of power and pitch attitude, impose	 }
on the pilot higher demands than does lateral. control.. This point is
tr
further substantiated by the evidence of the higher workload levels
which are induced by longitudinal control (Figure 3.11).
We wished to eliminate any learning effects from our experi ents.
To this end, the order of presentation of the experiae1tal treatm?nts
to each subject was randomized. In addition, each experimental session
brogan with a training period designed to bring the subject to a steady-
state level on the learning curve (Section 2.8). Indeed, an analysis
of variance of the tracking errors, treating the order of presentation
as an independent variable, showed that the null hypothesis could not
be rejected (Table 4.3).
4.3 Detection Perfoimiance
As Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, about 10% of all failures were not
reported by the subjects; about 7% were obviously not detected at all.,
as evidenced by the fact that these approaches did not terminate in a
successful landing because of gross deviations in the failed axis.
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19 Table 4. 3	 ANOVA of PMS Tracking Errors
E
by Order of Presentation
^
•Ii
E ^
i^
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F
f
Mean 13649.57 1 13649.57 510.7* 3
:F
Replications 547.72 14 39.12 1.5
Treatments:
Participation Mode 278.56 3 92.85 3.5
3
Disturbance Level 1218.43 1 1218.43 45.6* j
Order of
jj
EI
presentation 627.92 29 21.65 0.8
11
k
Error 3527.73 132 26.73
ti	 ,.	 {
4
f
:J	
1
: 	 :	 J
S
Y
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{
I
j
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A very interesting pattern is obvious from Tables 3.1 and 3.2
and from Figures 3.23 and 3.26: All failures in an automatically-
controlled axis were detected in consistently short times; between 9%
3
and 170 of the failures which occurred in a manually-controlled axis
were not detected at all, and the ones that were required considerably 	
=f
longer detection times. A t test revealed the difference between the
man detection times in the automatic and manual modes to be highly
significant, at the P < 0.001 level.
Our first hypothesis (Section 2.1) attempted to explain this
i difference in detection performance as being due, in part, to the
^I
increased involvement of the pilot in the control task in the manual.
mole and, in part, to the increased workload levels associated with
}}	 manual control.. We set out, therefore, to separate the individual.
I
j	 effects of these factors, participation mode and disturbance level.,
on the failure detection performance.
1	 3
1i
€ In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the mean detection tames of longitudinal
-	 s
and lateral failures, respectively, are plotted as functions of the
corresponding man eaorkload levels for the four participation modes.
#{	 The following relationships are evident:
fs
^
I	1r	 -
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1. Detection times in a manually-controlled axis are significantly
longer than detection times in an autmatically-controlled axis
(P < 0.001) .
2. Detection times for lateral failures are significantly
longer than detection times for longitudinal failures at comparable
workload levels (Table 4.4).
3. Detection times increase in direct relationship to work-
load (P n--163 = 0.322).
The apparent similarities between Figures 3.23 and 3.26 and 	 !
Figures 3.36 and 3.37, respectively, suggest an attractive theoy 	 i
to explain the shorter detection times in the automatic-control modes:
The lower angular RMS errors in the automatic modes effect higher
signal--to-noise ratios of the displayed tracking error which, in turn,
result in better detection performance.
This hypothesis was tested by analysis of variance of the failure
detection times, with the angular FMS tracking errors in the failed
axis as a covariate (Table 4.5). The F-test rejected the hypothesis,
as the PMS errors did not show a significant effect on the failure
detection tunes. A linear correlation analysis yielded the same result, 	 f
as the RMS-detection tin-e correlation coefficient fell short of
significance at the P < 0.01 level (Pn=163 _ 0.215). In addition,
under the SM theory, the tracking errors on the approaches in which a
failure was massed altogether should be larger than on other approaches 	 F
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M. S. F
279547.71 648.2*
3537.96 8.2*
800.53 1.9
10017.42 23.2*
431.14
. S.S. d.f.
279457.71 1
10613.87 3
1601.05 2
10017.42 1
67258.33 156
S.S. d.f_
110966.97 1
13556.86 1
10298.17 1
1053.07 1
.100.91 1
50785.94 144
M. S. F
110966.97 314.6*
13556.86 38.4*
10298.17 29.2x
1053.07 2.9
100.9 0...3
352.68
Table 4.4 ANOVA of Failure Detection Times by
Failure Axis
source
Mean '
Participation Mode
Disturbance Level
Failure Axis
Error
Table 4.5 ANOVA of Failure Detection Times
with RMS as Co-ariate
source
Mean
Participation Mode
Failure Axis
' E
	
Mode x Axis
RMS
Error
cdth comparable participation and disturbance conditions. A paired-
difference Student-t test, however, failed to reveal any difference...
Consequently, RMS tracking errors were excluded from further consid-
eration and the failure detection performance was assumed to be a
function of the control mode, of the failed axis and of the %aorkioad
level, but not a function of the RMS tracking error.
A disparity is obvious, however, between Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
The longitudinal failure detection data, shown in Figure 4.1 seem
to suggest that the increased detection tins in the manual control
modes P 3 and P4 are due mainly to the associated increase in workload
and that, had the subjects operated at a constant workload level.	 r
(that is, along a line normal to the abscissa), their detection perfor-- 	 y
rence would have, in fact, improved in the manual control erodes,
It should be noted that both Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are
plots of two dependent variables, as the workload level cvas controlled
in the experiment only indirectly. Consequently, there were masurement
errors in, both coordinates and therefore, the slopes of the straight
lines in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 could, in reality, be quite different
than those shown; one possibility is plotted in Figure 4.3. Oar
statistical tests (t and r) did not have sufficient power to reject
either possibility with any degree of confidence.
To resolve the ambiguity, we assumed that the fail?are detection
mechanism of the human operator acts similarly in both lateral and
longitudinal axes; any difference in performance between these axes
is due to differences in the plant dynamics and in display variables
only, not to differences in processes internal to the operator.
This assuaption of equivalence between the lateral and longitudinal
axes has been made, either explicitly or implicitly, by many inves-
tigators. it is based on the theory that the human operator behaves
optimally with respect to his task (cf. SmallEaaD.d, 1967) in all axes,
and that the operator adjusts his describing function to match the task
(Young; 1969):
Longitudinal and lateral failure data were thus Pooled;
.^__....^._N,..^_.__._._ 	 ^-
detection tirries were regressed on the type of failure (longitudinal
or lateral) and on the control mile in the failed axis, with the v ork-
load index as a covariate, based on the following additive model:
Tdetection -= TO + a (control mode) + R (failed axis) + y (workload) (4.2a)
A solution was obtained for the regression coefficients a, 0 and y:
Tdetection = 20.9 + 16.5M 15.4A + 0.IOWL	 (4.2b)---	 -
1 if the failed axis is controlled manually
where M
0 otherwise	 f
1 if the failure occurs in the lateral axis
A_=
0 if the failure occurs iri the longitudinal axis
WL = the normalized workload index
and Tdetection is measured in seconds.
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NQRMA^iZE^ 1dORK ^OAp
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L Fig. 4.5 Additive Model -- Lateral Failures
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4.4 Touchdowns
As mentioned in Section 3.4, 389 of the 450 approaches flown
terminated in attempted landings, 59 terminated in a missed approach
and two were discarded because of equipment malfunctions. The breakdown
of landings and go--arounds by failure type is sho-van in Table 4.6.
When the "acceptable landing„ criteria (Section 2.6) were
applied to the data, 193 landings were considered successful and 196
(or approximately 50%) were judged unsuccessful. Of these, 106 were
rejected because of an excessive deviation in any one parameter, 61
were rejected because of excessive deviations in two parameters
simultaneously, twenty-two - in three parameters, sax °- in four
parameters and one attempted landing was rejected because of simul-
taneous deviations in five of the seven parameters. Tables 4.7, 4.8
and 4.9 su c arize the touchdown performance «. a function of the
mm-mally-controlled axis and the presence or absence of flight-director
information (see also Table 2.2).
It seems clear from Tables 4.7-4.5 that the landing performance
:j
was quite poor under all but fully automatic conditions. Longitudinal
control presented a more severe problem to the pilot, as evidenced bJ
the difference in the percentage of successful landings which is
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11
WITH FLIGHT-DIRECTOR	 22.0 17.7	 46.2
WITHOUT FLIGHT--DIRECTC' : 24.2 	 9.1	 48.5
TOTAL.	 22.4 16.4	 46.6
Y:
See Table 2.2
ATTEMPTED LANDINGS
	
257	 68	 64
	
389
GO--ABOUNDS
	 11	 22	 26
	
59
TOTAL	 268'	 90	 90	 448
Including 178 workload-measurement runs in which no failures
were presented and go- grounds were not permitted (see Section 2.8.2)
Table 4.7 Touchdown Performance, pitch Manual
PERCENT OF	 LANDINGS, PARAMETER OUT OF TOLERANCE	 SUCCESSFUL
X	 Y	 SPEED SINKRATE PITCH BANK HEADING (ATTEMPTS)
Table 4.8 Touchdowm Performance, Yaw M
TOTAL
	
10.4 27.9	 26.1	 20.7
See Table 2.2
lal I
:TER OUT OF TOLERANCE SUCCESSFUL
r
PITCH BANK HEADING (ATTEMPTS)
3.1 8.8 2.6 43.0(193) --
6.9 0. 3.4 37.9(	 29)
3.6 7.7 2.7 42.3(222)
I
Table 4.9 Touchdown Performance, Split--Axis Control
PERCENT OF LANDINGS, PARAMETER OUT OF TOLERANCE SUCCESSFUL
X Y SPEED SINKRATE PITCH BANK HEADING (ATTEMPTS)
LATERAL 0. 24.5 0. 0. 0. 7.5 4.7 67.0(106)
LONGITUDINAL 27.2 0. 42.7 26.2 5.8 0. 0. 34.0(103)
MANUAL CONTROL,
ALL AXES 22.4 31.0 47.4 39.7 5.2 7.8 0.9 19.8(116)
tI
s
significant at the P < 0.01 level. Table Q.9 separates the effects
of manual control in the yaw and the pitch axes.
We cannot ascertain from the available data whether the poor
landing performance was due to insufficient information presented
by the displays, overloading of the pilot in the final stages of the
landing, deficiencies in the simulation or soue other causes. Some of
our subjects executed consistently good landings, which seen-ed to
indicate that the simulator could be landed successfully; some
subjects, experienced pilots as they were, did not, however. Further
study of the factors affecting pilots' performance in the final
phases of the approach and during the flare maneuver is clearly
necessary.
4.5 Applicability of the Results
We wished our findings to be applicable to the general population
of pilots who fly lar-visibility approaches in commercial jet transport
aircraft. Great care was taken, therefore, in designing the experiments,
in the development of the simulator system and in the selection of
subjects. These will be discussed in the following sections.
f
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4. 5 .1 Expe-rimntal Design
The research consisted of tuo factorial experiments, a 4 x 3
workload masurement test and a 4 x 3 x 3 failure detection experiment.
Two full-rank factorial experinents would have resulted in a total of 	 4
4x3 + 4x3x3 = 48 treatments per subject. This number was considered ,i
to be unrealistically large and, consequently, sore high level inter-
actions were partially confounded in the failure, detection experiment:
Each subject was presented only 18 of the 36 treatments, resulting in
a total. of 30 experimental treatments per subject. The particular
treatments were assigned to individual subjects in a way that resulted
in each pair of subjects being presented all the experimental treat-
1
,rents and thus each pair of subjects represented one experimental
block.
:.i
i
a
a^
We wished to estimate the accuracy of the significant differences
found in these experiments. Following standard procedures (Cochran and F
Cox, 1968, pp. 17-23) the a posteriori probability of significant
differences being detected was calculated for the worst case, namely,
the difference in detection thins between the lateral and longitudinal
axes. This case was considered worst as the man difference (15.4
seconds or 37.04% of the moan detection time) and the number of rep-
lications (45) were the smallest.
a.
r
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where t - Student's random variable
;r
6 - rrean of the detected difference
a - standard error per unit
r - nu-Lea: of replications
F
and P - -Level of stignificanceN
t
:c
From the analysis of variance of failure-detection times, the
following values were obtained:
6 = 37.040
c = 49.98% with 156 d.f.
Tatting, for this "worst case" computation, P = 0.05 one has, for
a
156 d.f.,	 1
t0.05,r^=156 _ Z0.05 = 1'95996
hence
z2(1-P)	
27.04	
- 1,95996 = 1.5537	 (4.4a)
(45} (49.98)
2(1-P) = 0.125	 . ' . P = 93.7%	 RAW
4
or
iI
i
r
1
3
E
f
i
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That is, the probability of a true difference being detected as a
significant difference is quite high, and the number of replicates in
} the experiment was sufficient for the accuracy sought,
1
4.5.2	 Simulator System
The simulator was intended to resemble a large transport jet
1 1
aircraft in the final approach flight envelope. The actual flight
pararm?ters of a DC-8 were initially used and later madified, following
a series of flight tests by an experienced Boeing-707 instructor
captain. The f fight tests included adjustment, with the aid of a
stop-watch, of the simulated aircraft's U-xottle and control responses
and of the effects of the flaps, landing gear and speed brakes.
tl
A subjective evaluation was solicited of the pilots who flewi(( the simulated aircraft (Appendix C and Figures 3.17-3.20). According
to thds evaluation, the stimulated aircraft was rated as corresponding
` to 4.0 points on the Cooper-Harper rating scale (Cooper and Harper,
1
1969, p. 12). This rating represents an aircraft in which adequate
performance is attainable with tolerable pilot workload but which has
sores annoying deficiencies. It should be kept in mind that the
^r -a
pilots evaluated the total aircraft system, including the intentionally
simulated failures.
r:
Due to technical and economic limitations, we used a fixed--base,
7
t
1,23
	
{
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or static, skiralator in this research. The case for the importance
of motion cues in flight sLuulations has been made by many investi-
gators; (cf. Gibino, 1968; Jacobs et aZ., 1973). our main purpose in
this research, however, was to document the pilot's failure detection
t
performance. The simulated failures were very subtle and it is our
belief that motion cues would not have aided the pilot in the
detection task, especially in the presence of the noise introduced
by turbulence and wind gusts, which are quite common during a bad-
weather approach.
i'	 3
s
4.5.3	 Subjects
3
JAll	 the fifteen subjects who participated in the formal
s
,t
experiment were professional pilots from two major domestic airlines
who were highly motivated, enthusiastic and intelligent. All but
four flew jet transport aircraft regularly; the four who dial not j
(one pilot who flew turbo prop transport aircraft, two second
officers and one retired captain) did not reveal any difference in
performance (RMS tracking errors, workload scores, touchdown per-
formance and failure detection times) when coupared to the other.
pilots. We are convinced that our subjects were a representative ;#	 a^
sample of the population of airline pilots.
jj
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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In the last decade, a great deal of thought has been given
to Category III landings and their implications. One area of intensive
.,C investigation centers around the role of the crew during the approach.
1
Current thought is polarized around two extremes:
k
^^
1.	 The crav is in the control loop and flies the aircraft in
z
f
accordance with instrument-generated steering signals.
2.	 Steering signals are coupled directly into the autopilot,
with the crew monitoring the system. a
It is axiomatic that a pilot should be capable of detecting
identifying failures in the landing guidance system accurately, w
reliably andl with minimal time delay. The purpose of this research
'r #11 was the study of the pilot's short-term decisions regarding performance `.
assessment and failure monitoring. he wished to investigate the
j.,
tf relationship between the pilot's ability to detect failures, his
degree of participation in the control task and his overall, workload
125
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1level. Also, we wished our findings to be applicable to the general	 3
population of pilots who fly lo-vi-visibility approaches in oanuercial
jet transport. aircraft.
E
Th this end, this research consisted of an experimental
investigation which was carried out in a static ground simulator.
Fifteen airline pilots flew zero-visibility landing approaches with
different degrees of automation and at different workload levels
which were induced by simulated wand disturbances. The pilots'
ability to detect failures and to provide a reliable manual back-
up capability was monitored and recorded.
The data were analyzed to identify statistically significant
relationships among the experimental treatments and the factors which
produced the optimal performance were sought.
`Wo hypotheses were tested in this research:
1. Both the participation mode of the operator in the control
task and his overall workload level affect his information processing
capability. The effects, then, of the operator's participation mode
and workload level on his failure detection performance are additive.
Manual tracking will result. in longer detection tiues. than will..
126
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monitoring a coupled, automatic approach, and higher workloads
will effect longer detection times than will low workload levels.
2. As the flight instL ments display angular, rather than
linear, deviat 4.ons from the localizer course and from the glide-
path, they increase in sensitivity as distance to touchdown decreases.
In addition, the penalty for error increases with increased proximity
to the ground. Additional processing demands are therefore placed
on the pilot and hence his workload increases in inverse-relationship
to altitude or to distance-to-go.
'I'o measure the pilot's workload, a "warning-light"-type
subsidiary task was selected for this research. It consisted of two
small red lights mounted above each other outside the subject's
peripheral vision field, and a rocker thumb switch mounted on the
left horn of the control yoke. The Lights provided the stimuli.
During the run the upper or lower light, with equal probability,
was lit at a random time for a maximum of two seconds. A correct
regrnnse by the subject to this stimulus -onsisted of turning the
L.ght off by a proper motion of the rocker thumb switch. The subject's
responses we:r,e processed and converted into a workload index.
1. For the purpose of this research, a simulator capability
^i
i
1?
1
including a digital graphics computer and a fixed--base cockpit
simulator has been developed. An integrated-cue flight director
system has been designed for t1-is simulator. Also, a two-axis auto-
pilot has been incorporated into Uie simulate-i which is capable
of flying ILS-coup i.ed approaches, in either axis or in both axes,
to touchdown. We also had the capability to add wind disturbances
to the simulation to induce different workload levels. The simulation
did not include any displays of a mods progress annunciator, movable
bugs or a fault annunciator panel, nor were there any warning flags.
The experimental variables to be investigated in this study
were ti-ie pilot's participation made in the piloting task, the work-
load induced by the control dynamics and by external disturbances,
f'	 and the pilot's failure detection performance. The experiment
involved four levels of participation:
Passive monitoring.
2. Split axis, yaw manual.
3. Split axis, pitch manual.
4. Full manual control.
TI-Lree failure conditions were used:
1. No failure.
2. Failure in the yaw axis. In this condition the autopilot,
if coupled, or the flight director would steer the aircraft away from
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the local.iaer course.
3. Failure in the pitch axis, similar in nature to a failure
in the yaw axis.
in addition there were three levels of wind disturbances.
The effects of the level of participation and of the wand
diturbance on the pilot's workload wera investigated in a full-rank
4 x 3 factorial. experiment. The effects of the level of participation
and of the wind disturbance on the pilot's failure detection perfor-
mance were investigated in a separate 4 x 3 x 3, partially-confounded
factorial experiment. The "no failure" condition was incorporated in
the design so that the subjects would not anticipate a failure on
each and every approach.
The following results were obtained:
1. The workload scores were sensitive to both participation
mode and the presence of wand disturbances.
2. There was a very marked increase in workload si r, s at
altitudes below 500 feet AGL, which was inversely related to distance-
to-go. This increase was observed even in fully automatic approaches,
Which seems to indicate the effects, possibly, of the pilot's mental
state arising from his awareness of the proximity of the ground, and,
therefore, that a significant reduction in the pilot's workload at.
f
i^
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low altitudes cannot be achieved by improved display design alone.
3. Detection times in a manually-wntrolled axis were
4
	
-'	 significantly longer than detection times ix: an automatically-
controlled axis.
I_;
	
fi^	 4. Detection Oxces for lateral failures were significantly
longar than detecti,,n tjims for longitudinal failures at comparable
workload levels. This result can possibly be attributed to sores
	
r,	 combination of the following factors:
a. A lateral failure, as simulated in our experiment, t
j:
resulted in a one-dot deviation in approximately 100 seconds, while
a longitudinal failure required only about 30 seconds to cause a. one-
dot deviation. The reasons for this are the differences in thF3
dynamics of the simulated aircraft in the lateral and longitudinal.
s
axes and the larger linear distance represented by a one-dot lateral
deviation (1.25 °), conpared to the distance represented by a one-dot
longitudinal deviation (0.35°).
b. As the lowest altitude at which a failure was presented
	
F	
_
s was 800 feet AGL, which corresponds to a distance of over 2 miles from
the runway threshold, the pilots may have assigned, in. that phase of
the approach, a higher priority to vertical positioning of the simulated
	f	 aircraft than to runway centerline alignment; consequently, they may
have been m«re sensitive to excursions of the glide-slope deviation
indicator.
t
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c. Both position and rate information are directly
available to the pilot in the vertical plane by means of the GST
and the vertical speed indicator, respectively. Lateral rate infor-
mation, on the other hand, is available only indirectly by means of
the heading displayed on the HSI; fur-Unermore, this information is
contaminated by extraneous inputs, such as lateral draft due to the
wind. The ready availability of vertical rate information, which
relies the pilot of the need to generate a large phase lead, may
be responsible, in part, for the better failure detection perfarmance
in the longitudinal axis.
5. Detection tams increased in direct relationship to work-
load:
Tdetection ° 20.9 + 16.5M + 15.9A + O.MW
1 if the failed axis is controlled manually
where M =
0 otherwise
1 if the failure occurs in the lateral axis
A_ =
0 if the failure occurs in the longitudinal axis
TEL = normalized workload index
and	 Tdetection is measured in seconds.
The model correlated with the data at the P << 0.001 level of
significance.
G. Finally, the touchdown performance was poor under all
131
conditions with the exception of the fully-automatic no--failure-r	 r
case. Of the attempted landings, 67% were acceptable under the split-
axis, yaw-manual mode of control; 34% were acceptable in the aplit-axis,
pitch-manual mode and only 19.80 of the attempted landings were
successful on fully-manual approaches. We could not ascertain from
the available data whether the poor landing performance was due to
insufficient information presented by the displays, overloading of
the pilot. in the final stages of the landing, deficiencies in the
simulat :• • -;ana other causes.
5.2 Conclusions
Our goal in this research was to identify the participation
mode and workload level which optimize the pilot's failure-detection
performance. For the failures considered here the results suggest that
a coupled, fully-automatic landing with the lowest possible workload
is called for in Category III operations, with the crew monitoring
the progress of the landing via a cockpit display. I^'urthe=re, as
manual touchdam performance with the simulated conventional flight
instruments was unacceptable by commercial operational standards, a
failure in the automatic landing system may have to be followed by
the initiation of a mandatory missed approach and a diversion to a
Letter visibility alternate field; unless the required progress is
132
made in display design and technology to radically improve manual
touchdown performance.
The detection times for pitch failures in a fully-automatic
mode ranged in our experiments from 7 seconds to 56 seconds, with
a mean of approximately 24 seconds. Yaw failures detection times
under the sane conditions - that is, a fully-automatic approach -
ranged from 17 seconds to 52 seconds, with a mean of approximately
35 seconds. Assuming a rate of descent of 10 feet per s6cond on the
final approach, our data suggest that below Category I decision
height a failure of the automatic landing system (as simulated in
our study) may not be detected at all or, at least, it may not be
detected in time to allow safe initiation of a missed approach.
Performance monitors and fault annunciator panels may alleviate the
problem somewhat and shorten detection times. They are inadequate
at altitudes below 100 feet, however (Vreuls et al., 1968a); also,
they are not infallible, and additional warning lights and buzzers
in the cockpit provide only more opportunities for malfunctions and
for crew confusion.
one possible answer to the dilemma may lie in the Independent
Landing Monitor concept. The monitor is completely independent of
the guidance systean and of current landing aids, thus reducing the
probability of simultaneous failures. It presents to the crew a
133
perspective life-like synthesized analog display of the runway
environment, enabling the pilot to monitor the performance of the
automatic landing system or to fly the aircraft manually, following
an autopilot failure, by reference to artificial visual cues. One
proposed ITM system (Parks and Tubb, 1970) was based on microwave i
transmitters or radio reflectors Installed along the runway edges.
The display, when augur-._.nted with aiding symbology (c-f. Wan Houtte,	
E
1970) may lead to safe Category III operations.
5.3 Recommendations for Further Research
	A very marked increase in workload scores at altitudes below
	 !
	
500 feet has been observed, even on fully-automatic approaches. As
	 `']
1
the pilot's failure detection performance was shown to be inversely
3
related to his workload, this phenonenon should be carefully inves-
tigated and its causes identified; an effort should be made to reduce
the flying pilot's workload during the final phases of the approach,
either through display design or by crew task allocation.
The pilot's failure-detection performance should be investigated
at a constant workload level; to validate our findings. An invariant
workload level across participation under. can be induced, possibly, by
a cross-adaptive concomitant loading task.
41
In our experiments the failure detection performance in the
longitudinal axis was significantly better than in the lateral axis.
One possible explanation of this result (see Section 5.1) is the
'I
availability of explicit rate information in the longitudinal axis.
This hypothesis should be tested and, if verified, the findings should
be applied to the design of the lateral deviation instruments.
As stated in Sections 3.3 and 4.3 all missed alazms occurred
in manually-controlled axes; no failures were irissed when the failed
axis was under automatic control. An attempt to explain this result
i
by variations in the signal-to-noise ratio of the displayed tracking
error failed, as the ME tracking errors on approaches which resulted	 '.
in missed alams were not statistically different from the tracking	 I	 k
errors on other approaches under cceparable experimental conditions.
other possible explanations of the difference in missed alarm performance
between manually- and autamtically-controlled axes may be:
1. As detection times in.manually-controlled axes were longer
than detection times in automati.cally--controlled axes, there was a
higher probability when the failed axis was controlled manually that
the approach would terminate (at touchdown) prior to detection. This
explanation leaves something to be desired as it does not address the
question of the basic cause of the difference in detection pGxxform nce
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between manually- and automatically-controlled axes.
2. When faced with simultaneous demands for monitoring and
control the pilot may divide his attention between the two tasks.
Under such "single channel" theory the fraction of attention allotted
to one of these tasks is not available to the other (even though the
pilot derives the information for both tasks from the same set of
displays), thus resulting in a better failure detection performance
when an axis is monitored by the pilot (and controlled automatically)
as compared to simultaneous monitoring and control.
Further study is clearly necessary to effect a better under-
standing of the causes of the reported missed--alaxm performance and
their implications in the context of low-visibility landings.
Finally, the behavior of the pilot during the last phases of
the approach is not. well understood. Factors affecting the pilot's
touchdo -;n performance should be studied and his information r eqd x'e-
nmts and processing mechanisms identified., as a prere quisite to
pilot-aircraft interface design; the design must be optimized if
future Category III operations are to maintain the excellent safety
record of cmmercial aviation.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATOR DYNAMICS
A.1 Equations of Motion
In order to describe fully the rmtion of a rigid airplane,
three frames of reference were used. They were the body-fixed frame
of reference and the cartesian axes E;, n and ^ assoc .ated i-rith it;
the so-called wind frame of reference and the spherical coordinates
V, y and ^ associated with it; and the inertial earth--fixed frame
of reference and the cartesian coordinates X, Y and Z associated
with it.
A.1.1 Body-Fixed Frarre
in the body-fixed frame of reference E is the longitudinal
axis of the airplane, positive fon%,ard; n is the pitch axis, positive
to the right; and C is the yaw axis, positive down; thus completing
a ri.gHL-handed orthogonal triad.
In this coordinate system, assuming small angular rates, one
has:
1.37
p VIA 	(A. 1)
q = m/111	 (A.2)
n/x 	(A.3)
where p, q and r are -.he angulax velocities aground the E, n and C
axes, respectively,
Z, m and n are the wn ents
and IV In and I^ are the principal mints of inertia.
A.1.2 Local-Wind Spherical Coordinates
In the local-wind frame of reference C  is along the velocity
vector v, y is the angle, in a vertical plane, between C  and the
local horizontal, positive upward; and ^ is the heading azimut-i
angle of the velocity vector, measured clockwise from the north.
The relationship Between the body-fixed and wind fraTres is shown
in Figure A.1. Transforming vectors from the body--fixed coordinate
system to the spherical wind coordinates, one has (Miele, 1962):
:I
j
i=
j
i„
f
-j
?	 1
I
Z	 3
I3	 -
t^
_	 1
a = q coso - p sink -- y cosh - cosy sine	 (A.4)
(cosy cosh Cosa - siny sina)- sink Cosa - r (A.5)
cp = p cosR cosa + q sink cosy - y sina - j; sing	 (A. 6)
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YNbiile the equations of mot-.on in the wind coordinates are
v = W (T cosy cosy - D - L sing - W sing)	 (A.7)
W Vgcosy (-T sing cosh cos y + L sinO)	 (A.8)
g__y W V {(T sing cosy + L cosa)cos^ - W cosy}	 (A.9)
and
6 = (a + y)coo + Bsin¢	 (A.10)
where a - angle of attack
0 - side-slip angle
0 - hank angle
2. All engines produce equal test, and the resultant thrust
axis coincides with the aircraft's longitudinal. axis.
3. All rates of rotation are small and hence, all products
of inertia. are negligible.
4. Fuselage side forces and secondary forces produced by
air hi.ttang the jet intakes at an angle to the thrust axis are
negligible.
S. Effects of curvature of the flight path due to motion
about the earth are negligible.
A.1.3 Aerodynamic Forces and N--ments
The aerodynamic Lift and drag forces appearing in Equations
A.1 through A.9 were defined as fol1cws:
L = SC V2	(A. 11)
D 
=2 SCdV2	(A. 12)
where p - density of air
S -- wing area
Ct , Cd coefficients of lift and drag, respectively
As this model was meant for use in final approach studies p
was assumed to remain constant at 0.0023 lb.sec2/ft 4 . The lift-
curve of die wing eras assumd to }- piece-raise linear with the
f _. L
	 I	 1___J
	 L	 1_.-.1
angle of attack (see Figure A.2) and consequently, a lumped coeffi-
cient of lift CL
q° z sacR/aa
	
(A.13)
i
and a lumped coefficient of drag C-
zsaCd/aa	 (A. 4)
were introduced. The final relationships for the lift and drag forces
were then
L qw2
(CL) a=230 (280 _ a) V2
5
= 0
D =qaVz
0<a< 230
23a < a < 270	(A.15)
270< a
(A. 16)
The lumped coefficient of lift was a function of flaps position
CZ, q*0 + CLf
(A. 17)
1_. _. ^
	 I	 J__	 1	 1	 1__ I	 i
k3
The lurid coefficient of drag was a function of flaps position.,
landing gear position and speed brake position
CD = 
	
+ q r + CD G + q S	 (A. 18)
0	 f	 g	 s
In addition, ground effect was included in the model, obeying the
relationship
CL=Cy(1+kh+x,-11)	 tA,l9)
ch
Ft
? d.
^,rllere h is the altitude andkg, kh
 and kA are constant coefficients.
i>.
The aerodynamic moments !Z, m and n were computed by passing the
appropriate control deflections through a simple gain
EQ = {k 'L^ C + lCknq C) V2 	(A_ 20)
m = knOcV2 + k (L cosa cos¢ - w cosy)	 (A. 21)
E;
j`.	 (taking into account pitching rents caused by lift and by the
f^
`	 fact that the center of gravity is Located forward of the aero-
dynamic center)
az = fic (q) + 0 - k r - k
	
}V2	 (A_22)
nn c 	 nQ c
_	 F
E^
' 	 E
14.4
(including a yaw damper in the model).
In Fquations A.20 - A.22, IC, 0c, and ^c are the roll, pitch and
yaw commands, respectively, and k^ Q, kQn , m, PAS , k  and kno are
constants.
As a first approximation, the parameters of a IC-8 were used
in the equations of motion (Toper, 1969) . The various parameters
were later refined folloeing a series of flight tests by an American
Airlines senior instructor captain with considerable Bneing 707-123
experience. The actual values can be found in Section A.5.
w
j
A.1.4 Earth-Fixed Frame
	 J
The origin of the earth-fixed coordinates for the model was
set at the glide-slope touchdown point of runway Q at Logan Airport
in Boston. In this frame of reference X lies along the runway center-
.
line, positive toward the far end of the runway; Y is normal to it
in the horizontal plane, positive to the right; and Z is normal to
both X and Y, positive up, thus completing a left-handed orthogonal
triad. The earth-fixed coordinates are shown in Figure A.3 together
with various landmarks and navigation aids.
The geometry of the runway environment is defined, in this
coordinate system, by:
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Fig. A.3 Runway Environment
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Localizer antenna is at X = 7500 feet, Y 0
Runway threshold is at X -1153 feet
Middle marker is at X -4800 feet, Y 0
Outer marker is at X = -5.49 n.m., Y = 0
Bost-on VOR is at X = -250 feet, Y = 4200 feet
Glideslope beam originates at X 0, and the glide-slope angle
is 3.031.
All approaches bogan. at X -12 n.m., Y -1 n.m. _,id Z 2500
feet, at aircraft heading and course of 65*. This course resulted in
localizes interception angle of 30 1 at approximately 11 n.m. from the
runway threshold, well beyond the outer marker.
By sinple transformation of the spherical wind axes one obtains
the kinematic equations of motion of the airplane's center of gravity
in the earth-fixed axes:
V sing	 (A.23)
V cosy cos (0-35')	 (A. 24)
V cosy sin( 35°)	 (A. 25)
For the purpose of various uYeasurem-ents during the approach (see
Section 2.6) an X -coordinate, distance from the runway threshold,
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yn+l = e	 yn + T'^n +l yo=0 (A.31)
Since, for a square distribution,
a2 = (2P) 2 /12
.'. P = X12 ax/2
	
(A. 29)
,The gust scqurl nce yn was obtained from the random sequence x 
by passing it through a first-order filter G (s)
G(s) = 1/(s + w i ) 	 (A, 30)
The output of the filter was sampled by the program at intervals of
T seconds (the program's update rate), to obtain the gust sequence
Hence, the gust sequence has the following statistics:
yn = T	 but x  = 0	 yn = 0
	 (A. 32)
-2W.T
ay = e	 ay +Tax
	 (A. 33)
or
--2-w-T L
C5	 T
	 (A. 34)
y
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It was desired that the wind gusts yn should not exceed some preset
maximum value Vex 99.75% of the time (which, for normal distributions,
corresponds to 3a ). Therefore, Y - V ,/3 and
	
s
Vttax	 -W2wiT
ax 	 3
-2w. T
.'. 
P= 12c 2-^Vmax (1--e ^ ) z
V	 -2wiT
mTax ( 1 - 3	
}
The use of the no)-nal distribution property is justified as the
output of a linear filter has approximately normal statistics.
To sumarize:
1. A random sequence was gennxated
	
x
n+l - (7701 xn + 3927)md(10000) 	 X'0  7129
2. A modified sequence was defined
	x'	 2V	 -2wiT
X	 n	 1) max (1 - e	 )
n v x'10000	 2 T
	 3
where Vlnax - the desired maximal gust velocity
W  - the gusts' cutoff frequency, set at n/6 rad/sec
151
and T •- the program's update rate. -0.2 seconds.
3. The sequence x  was passed through a filter G(s)
G (s) (s ++ mi)
to obtain the random wind gusts.
Figure A.6.
A.2.1 Dynamics
4. hs a final step, a steady (constant) wind was superimposed
on the gusts.
f :a
in a series of tests the actual means and standard deviation of
the generated dusts were found to be within less than 1.2% of the
predicted values, even when as few as 150 sample points were used,
and t- and F-tests could not reject the hypotheses that the actual
statistics of the gusts were equivalent to the predicted ores. A
typical time history of the gusts over 200 seconds is shoran in
The aircraft was assumed to posses two separate motions:
1. Motion relative to the air (wind axes)
2. Motion of the air relative to the around, defined by the
wind speed V and its heading,`
The vector addition of these b.;o motions defined the motion of the
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(s) 	 1
Vna(s) - Ts + 1
V^ T (Viw - n ) - -lr- % s
in (^W -^(1) - VzI
or
Vg = V+Va Cos
and the total side-slip angle 
^T is
O
T = 
0 + arctan(Vzw - V) /Va
aircraft relative to the ground.
'^	 1
1
Also, if there was a component of the Wind, V nW, normal to the
heading of the aircraft ^, the aircraft Was assured to acquire a
component of velocity VZ ir_ that direction (normal to its heading) 	 i
relative to theound according to the relationsh ip^	 g	 p
The ground speed, Vg, was then computed from the airspeed 
a 
ar 3 the
..	
-
wind velocity V a:
x = [ a + v ,7 cos( sa --)]cos( - 35°) - Vn sin (q) -- 35°)
(A.41)
vY = [va + w cos (^o-^ - ^} ] sin Q - 35°) -- V Z sin W - 35')
The geometry is illustrated in Figure A.7. Fbr the purpose of
the simulation, the following values were used:
T = 1 second
TV = 80° (45° to the runway heading, which was 350)
and three values for V
1. v a = 0, Vex = 0 (no wind) .
2.w = 5 knots steady wind plus gusts ranging between +10 knots.
3. w = 10 A. shady wind plus gusts ranging between *20 knots.
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'-	 A.3 slight Directors and Autopilot
{	 An integrated-cue flight director display was used in the
simulation. At the initiation of each approach the flight director
was slaved to the ar-U flcial horizon anO cammanded the straight-and-
level condition. The lateral (TAC) made engaged auton 	 ally at
two-dot deviation (2.5°) from the localizer course; the longitudinal
made (APPR) engaged at one-dot deviation (0.35 1 ) from the glide
`	 slope. At an altitude of approximately 60 feet above the rLuiway
elevation the flare mode became operational and the letters FLR
}?	 appeared on the flight director display.
I^
j
A.3.1 Ifingitudinal Mode
First-order transfer was utilized in? the longitudinal director
I
(Weir and Klein, 1970):
4
0.5 0P = -3.6(0.0005 h + 	 )	 (A.42)e s + 0.034
where FD is the flight director's pitch attitude command and h e , t1i	 p
altitude deviation in feet from the glide path, was computed by
i	
r
`	 e	
Z - X tan(-3.03 0 )	 (.x.43)
R	 j'
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and
= Z - X tan(-3.03 0 )	 (A.44)
d	 :; 7
The time--rate of pitch, 0, in radians per second, was found from +;
Equation A. 10:
A : 0 = (a + y)coso +	 sine + [a cosh - (a + y)sin0j;
	 (A.45)
The control sequence FDp was mechanized digitally by a trapezoidal
}
int.^gration:
(gip)	 `3.6[0.0005(h  	 + 0.034 h ) + 0.5 0 3 - 0.034 (FDp )n+^	 e	 e	 n
and	 (A.46) .
-	 g
(FD) n+1 - (FD ) n ^^ (FD ) n+^ Atp	 p	 p
A.3.2	 Flare Path
During the flare maneuver it is desired to cause the aircraft x=
^
to approach the ground asymptotically while fo"iowing an exponential
flight path. Refex-i,ng to Figure A.8 one has
h 	 e t/T+ho	 T	 (A.47)
h --- (ho/T) e^t^^	 (A.48)
a {'	 d
^t
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but, from Eq. A.47
h	 e t'/T	 h - hT (A. 49)
o
.'.
 h = z
	
(h - hT)•(-1) (A.50)
and
q;
h = hT - Th (A.51)
Assuming that h µ hT
 in N time-constants T and that X is approximately
invariant, then
t
D = N , T •y	 .. T = D/NX (A.52)
and
h W h z, - D • h/ (N - X) (A.53)
s: at the initiation of the flare maneuver t=0 and
I
t
D is the distance downrange that the aircraft will travel between the-
- initiation of flare and touchdown.
We introduced the bias hT
 because of the delay in the response
of the aircraft to control. inputs: It is assumed that at touchdown the
i
aircraft will be below the computed path by this amount.
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Equation A.53 was used to compute the nominal path; deviations
from this path were fed to the longitudinal flight director as
altitude-error signals during the flare.
The parameters hT , D and N were adjusted o-n:irically. As
X = V cosy,o = V sing one has, from Equation A^.5
on a nominal glide path y = 3.03°; for the best touchdown
performance, in tortes of sink rate at touchdown and longitudinal
=e	 ;
dispersion, values of D = 2550 feet at N = 3 and h T = 15 feet we e
used. These yielded a nominal flare altitude of 60 feet; the actual
altitude at which flare command was to be initiated, based on the 	 {
F
airplane's ground speed and sink rate, was computed in real tim
from Equation A.54.
A. 3.3 Lateral Mode
Second-order transfer was utilized in the lateral flight
director (ibid.):
FD	 -0.2• [ a (b^ + c + dc) + fc + gel
	
(A.56)
r	 (s+T )(s+z2)
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where a	 0.62
t
b = 8.6
0.9C -
d = 180
f = 2.7i
j_
g = 15.6
((
1.
T1 = 1.06
P
T2 = 0.16
:^
and where s, the angular deviation in radians from the localizer
course r was computed by
E
	 Y/ (-X)	 (positive to the right)	 (A.57)
-
f
S.'
f5 	 :,
Now, 3
a	 _	 R	 R
(S+T1)(s+T2} - s+T2	s +T1
-' (A.58)
R =	
a	
W 0.6889T1 - T2	
'
and
r
R	
+	 ' +	 -	
R	 +	 +IT'D	 = -0.2 ^S (b 	 c	 de }	 (b	 + c¢	 d^ }	 fc^	 qE ]	 (A. 59)
} +T	 S+T2	 1
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The control sequence FD  was mechanized digitally by a trapezoidal
numerical in egration in a way similar to that of the longitudinal
director (Equation A.M .
A, 3.4 Autopilot
The autopilot was mechanized by feeding a function of the
flight-director's commands as control inputs:
Cc = kl ( ^) + k2 (ED	 (A, 60)
^c	lc3 (FDr) + k4 (Ebr)	 (A.61)
c = -	 (A. G2)
At altitude of 200 feet the pitch autopilot stopped trackinq
the longitudinal flight director and maintained, instead, a glide path
of 3.031 in an open-:loop fashion until the flare maneuver was to be
initiated; during the flare maneuver the lateral autopilot disengaged
from the flight director and maintained wings-level attitude.
The autothrottles were mechanized by computing the appropriate
thrust required to null the velocity time--rate-of-change (Eq. A.7) at
a nominal reference airsrced (see Table A.1).
i
i
Table A.1 Approach Reference Speeds
failure.
Failures in the guidance system were simulated by feedinq a constant
bias deviation into the appropriate flight director system (but co*
into the raw--data indicators, that is, the CDI or the GSI). I::a bias
was computed to correspond to one-dot deviation at the point of
	 ='
:7ailure occurrence; from that point on, until the failure was correctly
identified, the aircraft was guided to intercept and track a path
parallel to the nominal path but translated by the amount of the bias,
as shown in Figures A.9 and A.10. This enabled us to introduce failures
at different altitudes without having the data contaminated by unwanted
i;
effects, such as differences in the aircraft's rate-of-turn or sink rats
f>	 ..
and in the rate of motion of the deviation indicators, following a^.'
164



When a failure occurred in a manually-controlled axis the pilot
was guided by the flight director to intercept and track the new path.
When the failure occurred in an autopilot-coupled axis the autopilot,
driven by the flight director, trackF ' the new path. Tn each case the
subject was expected to detect the failure by reference to the raw--
data indicators, x;,hich did not fail. To this end the flight director
display was biased out of view whenever the autopilot was coupled.
Failures were presf7rited at altitudes between 1800 and 800 feet.
The choice of altitudes was randomized, as were the order of presen-
tation and the direction of the failure, i.e., left-right for a
lateral failure and up--dawn for a longitudinal one.
A.5 CSauter Prcgrams
Three coiqDuter program were used: A "No Failure" program which
included the workload measurement subroutine, a "Pitch Failure" program
and a "Yaw Failure" program; both of the latter accepted as inputs the
altitude at which a failure was to occur and its direction. At the
begining of each run the appropriate program was loaded from a console
in a room adjacent to the simulator.
Documentation and Iisti_rtgs of the programs are presented in the
remainder of this Appendix.
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PP.OGRAH PUF
C
C4^^	 PROGRAM: NO FAILURES
t:
GLOBAL ITIME,NF
IMPLICIT FRACTION CF>
LOGICAL CONE
REAL FLAPS
L	 OTSERRORS=SHORT
COIII40N/CSTASY./I•tSTSK, TOTTY., ET I14E, LTON,11S l11OLD, T 1!•tEOtf, TIIIEOFF
COIIMON/CNTRL/T,FLAPS,CTETA,CPH1,Cgl,GEAR,AFLARE.SPSRY,
COMMOtt/CNTRL/BTETA,BPH3,BXI
CO gl40 N/PR14TP./V,XI,VG,VW,COSXW,SIt1XW,COS35,51N35,SETAG,Vt1ORM,CRAB
r , '''nN/PPMTP./GAt111A, ALPHA, BETA, PHI , VX, VY. VZ, THETA, A, ti:14, Y, R
)II/DPF,t4T R/DV, DX I , DGAMA, DALFA, D?ETA, DFH I , D T. D'. Z
I	 I/AN;•SI NA, SIIIG,SIIIP.SINB.51FMCO$Ai COSG.CO•;P,COSX
COt114Gr1/>: PAC/FV, FB11K, FP I CH, FA. FA100 , FVZ, FROG. FADF, FVOR, FCP ICH
COMMON/FRAC/FCBNK,FER,FHEP.,[W.E.(5), MODE (6),FTETAO
COI4MOti/FI?/7+DF, VCR. CP I CH, C8Nr„ EPS, HER. F."D, GUST. THE TAO
COMMON/A IJ TO etC BNK t , C'CRNr.2, C• CP I CH, CAPTR, WSJ, W, VZO , . FLi4RE
COMM014 STORT(100),TOTT(IS0),STOPX(150).STORA(150),SIGRY(ISO)
CUMHOIE LDCT,LOC[^.I1T'^..XttlSSti100),}'HIT(100)
DATA RRp/5T.296f.W/1b50G4./.f,W/0.0001155/
DATA TMRKRI/0.4815/,T14PKR2/0.068/,TMRKR/0.0076/
DATA TNCSA/-0.05293?/
DATA COSXW/0.173649•',SIIIXW/0.5849OS/
DATA COS35/0.815152/,SItF35=0.573576/
WRITEC10,200 )
READ( 10,2006:NAME
2005 FOPHATC' ENTER 5-LETTER CODE'/)
2006 F'ORMATC95)
DECODE(5.2008.IrANE,H)INHNE
IF(I14 ;LME.EP, 40404040•;OB)NAtlE=Nfi14E.R: 18
DECODE(5,2007,11WIE.H)IDIST
2007 FORMAI;3X,I1)
2008 FORI4ATCZk.A3)
VWO=IDIST*5.
PRA14D=IDIST-11,6936
I F ( NAt1E . ER . 77777740 X30 B) PRAIID ^0 .
ENTRY NF
C
C ,P**	 TURN OFF ALL LIGHTS AND SAMPLE SIDE-TASK SWITCH
C
I CONT I14UE
A	 ADEPT
11DAR TURNOFF
ARIC'A'F
14DAP HSTASK
S6AP.'A'F
JPLS 14STSKOII
vRILTNAL .pAff s;i
OP POOR QUALITY,
1
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} FORTRAN
I MSTSK=O
GO TO B
A	 ADEPT
IISTASK:	 01H00200
MSTSKON:	 HoOP
FORTRA14
MSTSK=:
B	 CONT INUE 1
c
E ns*h	 INITFALIZE ALL VALUES
c °e
GAII14A=0 .
DGAMA=O.
XI=65.
FEYY=O OF
ALPHA=6.
THETAO=4.
e 4ETAG=O.
p SETA=0 ,
DF14G=2550 .
AFLAPE=O.
IFLAP.E=O
TOM= IMM=[IM=O
i; JJFF=0
' ETIME=TOTTX=O.
iy LOCT=LOCP=O
` LTON =11 I35=NSUOLD=0
(= TIMEOH=5.
T I IIEOFF=2 . 1
' XME-12.
Y=— E030.2 i
YQR=43.047 i
E; ADF=43.732
VG=170.
V.X=VG•O,666026 t	 i
^- VY=VG *0.5
3! ; V2=0 . k
g!+
y
i-
i,
WAUTM
IE^^
E
170
1
..:
f	
7 !	 ^.
l -;
YZO=-1.
IPOU14=7129
GUST=O.
VW=vino+GUST
YNORI4=0 .
V-VG-VW* ( COSX%'*0 .422618+S I14XW*0 .906308 )
R=D.
THETA=ALPHA-2.
DIST=SGRTC(X14+0.0411) 4w2+(Yi6080.2-0.6908) #*2)
S5LOCK=0.
MODFDa "'1
LABELOODE)
ZSETCO.OF)
M3VECO.2SF,0.6SF)
WP.ITE(16,556)MQDFD
EFIDI.I ST
LABCL(DKE)
2SL:T(O.F)
fIOVE(-0.805F,-0.014S4F)
WRITE(15,555)DIST
EIIULI ST
XFEETZ Yjj460es.2
EPS, w Y/(-kX?1-1 .23)46^880.2)
MEP-R-.:FE ET^^ -0. R:.2:+.'3)
CPECHI-CFICH=O.
DCPIC4=0.
C8IIKI = CBI1K=CE^ = r.2 = 0 .
D MW: 1 =M E,!11'2=0.
ETCTA= 8PH1-B:%I=-O,
CALL SAMPLE
STETA=CTETA
BPHI=CPHI
BXI=CXI
CALL PTOF
CALL 'ERIC
START THC DISPLAY
JPSR $GRAFX
$DIALS
5
*	 INITIALIZE DATA —UPDATE CLOCK
2 ITIME=I^
ENTER WAIT LOOP IF SWITCH 8 (START) IS NOT ON
IF(.NOT.SWITCH(6))G0 TO 2
EXECUTE U14LESS SWITCH 12 (FREEZE) IS 014
6 IFC.NOT.SWITCH(12))GO TO 3
i
AFTER SWITCH 12 HAS CEEN PRESSED, EXIT IF SWITCH 16 i.o ON
7 IF(SWITCHCI6))GO T4 4
*	 OR 1NITIALI2E VALUES IF SWITCH 4 (IC) 19 ON...
IF(SWITCH(4))GO TO 5
OR START EXLCUTION AGAIN IF SWITCH 8 IS ON...
	 {
IF(S'l1ITCM8))C3 TO 6	 1
y
OR INITIALIZE DATA —UPDATE CLOCK AND ENTER A WAITIBr^ LOOP
IT 1!•tE-1
GO TO 7
5 CONTINUE
STOP THE DISPLAY AND GO BACK; TO INITIAL VALUES
JPSP 3NHALT
HOOP
GO TO 1
C
C41
C
A
A
R
C
C**
C
C
C*a'
C
C
C**
C
G
C**
C
C
C**
C
C
C***
C
C
C
C+,**
C
R
A
i ) j
_i
-i
i G
y
G•dN START EXECUTION OF A NEW DATA-UPDATE CYCLE:
C*** COMPUTE DT (=TIME IN SECS OF PREVIOUS CYCLE)
a'
C*t q- AND INITIALIZE DATA-UPDATE CLOCK.
C
3 TIME=ITIME
x IT IME=O
DT=TIMQ 120.
CALL DYHNF
CALL TRIG
C
i C** COMPUTE RANDOM DISTURBANCE CGUSTS)
C
L INTEGER:.=LON^
IRtiU 44=M4UCt7 ,QfWIPMt3M + 3927) , f0000)
RtiLSx]= E RN6j'4
L IN7EGERS=S}TORT
p' DVWI=CPHUMwI0009.-Q.5)MPF^AND 4
I" OUST=GUIT+tDVN L-0.104 ZIC UST)&DT
VW-VW0 4 GU;T	 $
Y,FEET V0 60 0 . 2
IFC:-:FEET .EO.O. )){FEET=1 .
YM1LE=Y16720,2
.; C
C* COMPUTE THETA-DOT	 C=PITCH-ANGLE TIME-P,ATE OF CHANGE)
'S
€
TDOT=(DALFA+DGAt1A)*COSP+bBETA+SIHP+CBETAoRAD+COSP-CALPHA+GAMMA) j	 a
E wsIHP , wwD)+ l pHl
C >
I C*** FLARE COMMAND COMPUTATION
C
IFC If LAP013, 35
• 35 DENOM =3.j 	:,,'	 .3367
r, AFLARE=AV0.	 5.-GFNG4VZ,DrUQM) - 120.) p
IFCA.GT.AF ,	 O E )GO	 TO 31
^
IFLARE = 1	 , 7	 1
l
l'
f
I
'
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y'
IYz0 a AM1111 e (VZ+150	 -150
cplcHlv4.
MODFD="FLR."
LABEL(MODE)
ZSET(O.F)
AOVE(0.23F,0.66F)
WRITE(I6,556)1tODFD
ENDLIST
556	 FORMAT aG 11 , B4
33	 HERl=A+TAlJ*VZ-15.
HED0T=VZ/60,+TAU*DVZ
GO TO 32
31	 HERmA-NFEET*TflrSA
HERI=HER
HEDOT=YZ/60.+V1( 41,68894*(-TtIGSA5
FLIGHT-DIRECTOR PITCH COMMAND
C
32	 DCPICHn-0.6*(0.0005*4HECiOT+0.034#HERI)+0,5*TDOT)-0.024*CPICHI
CPICHI=CPICHI+DCPICHtDT
INIFLAPE)SO01,8002
9001
8002 CONTINUE
,IF(R.LE.AFLAPL)GO TO 22
C
CENTEP FLIGHT-DIPECIOR	 IF OUTSIDE OF
C*41*	 GLIDE-SLOPE RECEIVER PAUL-E
C
CAPTR=I.
IF(ABS(HER/•FEET).L-5.0.006)GSLOCt,=I,
IF(CSLOCK)22,402
402	 CONTINUE
c'PICHM-GW.11lA
DCPICHo•Df,AhA
CPICHI=O.
CAPTR=O.
22	 CONTINUE
CPICH=AM0D(CPICH,360.)
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c
C*W*	 FLIGHT-DIRECTOR LATERAL COMMAND
C
IF(XM.E0.1.23)X14=1.2's0I
EPS=YMILE/(1 , 23-Xld)
EPSDT=VXi3600 . *YMILE-^( (%td-1.23)+(};ld-1 .23} )-VYi3E00. /(xv:-1 .23)
DCBN1:1=-CO,1+(5.4244*DXI+3.32'E.DPH1+139,6*EPSDT
1 +0.432+PHI/PAD+2.4.3*CPS>+0.16+CE'.'Jri)
DCBNK2=0.06S89'+C$.6+DFI+0.9tivPHI{180,+EPSDT)-1.06*CBNK2
CBNK=CB1lK,+(DCBrO 1+DCBNr.2) *DT +RAD
CB14K1 =CB1lK1+DC5NF;l *&T
C$HK2=CPNt:2+DC8N1,2+DT
IF(ABS(EPS).LE.0.045)G0 TO 21
CBNK=C8UK1=C5NK2=DCB1jKI=DCENK2=0.
21	 CONTINUE
CBIJK,=AMOD(C£NI' 300.)
IF(XM.EQ.-5.4896)XM=-5.4995
C
C***	 VOR, ADF AND :•rr INFORMATION
C
ADF=35 . -ATAti (YtiI LEi(-);t4-5 . •1896)) *F'AT
IF( XM,GT.-5.4g96)AGF=++iF+183.
IF CXL1.EO,-0.4411);;14=-O.0410
VOR='5.-r+7AN^ t'i tIILE-0 . b'+08)x(-0.0411-Xt17) ^t'<AG
IF(1J4.GT.-O.Gal!)VUR=VOei+190.
ADF=AHOD?H4aF.360.)
VOP=AMOV VDR.360.)
CALL RTQF
CALL STASK
DIST=SQRT((Xtt 4 O .0411)+*2+(Yl4ILE-0.0,906)+*2)
LASEL(DVE)
2SETC0.07)
MOVEC-0.''05F.-0.01434F)
WRTTE(16.'555)DIST
555
	
FOPHAT("6y".F4.1)
ENDLIST
175
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`	 r
7
CONE=.FALSE.
IFCEPS.LE.O.05,AND.EPS.GT .-0,05)CCINEO.TRUE.
}
}^	 C
C***	 TURN OUTER MARKER LIGHT ON
e
IFCABSCKHIS .4C96).LE.TMRKRI.AUD.CD"E)IOM=1
C
_	 C***	 TURN MIDDLE MAPKER LIGHT ON
I;	 C
IFCAB_CMM+0.7596).LE.TMRKR2.AND.CONE)INM=I
G***	 TURN SUER MARKERLIGHT ON
^:	 C
j;
	
	
IF(ABSCXH+0.I?96),LE.TMRKR.AND.	 CONE )I!M=I
CALL BEACONSCIOM.IHM,IIM.JJFF3
C
C**+	 EXIT IF ALTIii16E=0}.	
C
IFCA)4.4,6
4 CONTINUE
i'	 Cr.
j_	 C*4,*	 STOP THE DISPLAY, TUP_H ALL LIGHTS OFF
E :.	 C
A	 JPSR INHALT
CALL STOW
A	 ADEPT
MDAP. TURNOFF
ARICWF
JUMP .+2
TURNOFF: 77076057777
1.	 1400P
t;	
FORTRAN}
XFF=XM*6OE0.2+1153.
.'	 ^3CDT=1 . •D7
E
s
t
r^
j`	 7
i
i^
fi
Ca> SHOW PARAMETERS AT TOUCHDOWN ON THE CRT SCREEN
C
WRITE(25,2000>
1 WRITE(25,:00I)XFF,Y,V
WRITE(25,200P)VZ
WRITE(25,200:)AFLARE
s;I=x;-CETA6
TRACK-XI*CPAB
WP.ITE(25,2063)THETA,PHI,KI,TRACT(,CPAS,DT,F'DT,LOCD,LOCT,t-IISS
2000 FORMAT(/r///27X,"PAPAmETEP.S AT TOUCKOWN OP AT STOPHGTl^7p".'^)
2001 FOF.FIAT(27X,"DISTi4?4fE	 FPOM THRESH(tGD	 ",F15.0,"	 FT."/
I	 27X,'DISTAl10E	 FROt4	 CEVTEPLIHE",FI5.0,"	 FT."/
-- 2	 27Y.,"INDICATED AIPSPEED	 ',FI5.0,"	 KNOTS")
f
^.: 2002 FOPMAT(27 V ,"JEPTICAL	 SPEED	 ",FI5.0,"	 FPII")
t; 2004 FORMAT427X,"F I kKE	 COMMWkDED	 AT ALT.	 '.FES,l,"	 FT,")
2003 FORtlAT(	 /27x."PITCH ANGLE	 11IF5,01,	 D"^GS."f
!	 27X,"SIVW	 ANSLE	 ",FS.U,"	 DE?:S."^
E 2	 27X, "HEAD ING	 ",F5.0,"	 DEGS.
1-' 7	 27X."GPOUNC	 TPFCY,	 F5.0,"	 C,EGS.
3	 2?X,"CPAD ANGLE	 ',F5.0,"	 PEGS.
4	 27X."	 DT
5	 27X."DATA UPDATE PATE s	 I2/
li: 6	 27X,%000=",13,"	 HITS=`	 1.1,	 MISS='	 13)
C
C+*a OUTPUT FLIGHT DATA TO DISK
.: C
3.'. IF(INAME.ED.4040404040B3 GO	 TO 601
CALL OUTPUT
G01 CONTINUE
EX i r
f
f
C*** SUBROUTINE TO OUTPUT DATA TO DISK
C
D1I4ENSION	 1BUFF(20B)
TDETECT=O.
F ( TIDENTmO.
` 0PE11( I-0,2 010UFF.11AME)
WRiTE (21)Y,FF. Y,V,V2. THETA, PHI .X I. CRAB, TDETECT.TIVEHT,NAME
WP.ITEC2 1) LOCG.t30TT ( I),STOP.XiI>.570RACI >. 5TdF. Y(I).7 = 1.LOCD)
DO	 1	 K=1.50
CONTINUE
1 CONTINUE
I` CLOSEC21)
OPEW 2_, 0, 2,	 1 BUFF, '+HITSTASK*')
WRITEc22 ) LOCT
IFcLOC7.EO.CiG0 TO	 130 5
L:4ITEi2, 	ST0RTC1),:dHIT(1).1
	
1.L0CT)
f' 1313 COUT;urJE
DO	 c^	 V = 1 ,5L1i' COUTI14LIE
2 COIrF F11UE
CLRSEC32)
OFENl	 23,0,?	 :1 DUFF. '+MI5STA,;;!
DIP ITE(23)111Sc
IF(MISS,EQ.o)u0	 TO 40
UPI TE(23)1):1LI'?S(I?,1=1.MISS)
40 CGNT I NVE t	 -
^^r^_ D0	 3	 1: = 1,50
COLT I MIE 'r
r , 3 CONTINUE
` CLOSE(23)
I PFTURI1
•s
i`
END
-
f
^c
1
r.
i
I.
S;
1.
i
ij.
jr
^x
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SUBROUTINE SAMPLE
C
C***	 SUBPOUTINE TO SAMPLE COCKPIT CONTROLS
C
IMPLICIT FRACTION!F)
REAL FLAPS	 E
COMe14N % PRFITP ,' Y, X ] , VG, VW, COSXW, S III,SW, CO535, SI 135, BETAG, VN0R!4, CFAB
COMMON/CNTPL/T, FLAPS, CTETA,CPHI,CXI, GEAR, AFLAP.E,SPBP'Y..
COMMON/CIITRL GTETA,BPHI,l;XI
A	 ADEPT
FPR I
MD07'F 0 i
0:0:0
MD07'F	 10
0;0
S5MD FSPBRK
HDO7'F 24
0;0
S5i+[.	 FTI	 e
MI .07'F	 40
S5flD F12
MD07'F	 100
0;0	 j
S5FID FT3
1iDO?'F 200
9;9	
^
S5MD FT4
1iD97'F	 0
MD07'H Cl
0;0;0
MD07'L;	 I!Hl
0;0	 ,i
S5MD FFLAPS
IID07' L:	 I I H2
0:0	 —
S5MD F'NKE
MD07'L;
	 I!H4
0:0
S5MD FUHEEL
IID07'L;	 1 !1410
0:0
S51-ID FPEDL
MD07'H Cl
0:0:0
UPRI
sf	 -
i
t
t—
1'y 
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f.:
is
14DAR MASK
S6AR'A'F
ARAP'H'F
JPLS DOWN
MDAR ZEPO
ARHD Fi-EAP.
JUMP BACK
DOWN:	 MDAR ONE
ARND FGEAR
JUMP Bi4CK
MASK:	 00160EH0
ZERO:	 01Ha
ONE:	 01H37777
FGEAR:	 0
FSPERK:
	
0
FT1: 0
FT2: a
F73:	 0
FT4:	 0
Cl:	 0!H00001
FFLAPS:
	
0
FYOFE:	 0
FWHEEL :	 0
FPEDL:	 0
EACY.:	 HOOP
FORTRnH
SPERK=FTOR(FSPEPK)
FLAPS=AF1r+:=.2(0 . OF. FFLAPS)*? .5603
CTETI=-rlCP(F'CVE)+12.FS-3TETR
CPH1=-FTCPtFWHFCL)*42.5-6PH1
CNI=FTOP+ FF'E1,L74_0.;-FS y:1
THRUST=FTCR(FT1+FT21+F70i(FT3*FT4)
IF( THPUST-1.04E7?01.201.2fl0
200	 T=60000.4(THPUST-i.0•:2}*17?)a,
GO TO 203
201
	
T=60000.-(1.044-THRUST)424221.
IF( TH UST-.376)202.efic,203
202	 T=3004.-(.376-THRUST)*?102.
203	 IF(V-200.)204,204,205
204	 T=T*300.ikV+100.)
GO TO 20E.
205	 T=T*(SOOOO	 V«V+10000.))
206	 GEAR=FTUF'(FGEAP.)
RETURN
CND
t
'f
C
C***	 SUBROUTINE TO OPERATE MARKER —BEACONS' LIGHTS
C
IF( IOM. OR. I till. OR. 1Ib1)j, 10
9	 C0147 114UE
JJFF=JJFFai
GO TO (8,8.6.10),JJFF
8	 CONTINUE
IF<1014)1,4
4	 IF(114M)2.5
S	 IFQIl4)3,6
C
C**,	 NONE OF THE LIGHTS SHOULD BE ON:
Cmd,*	 TURN TdE" ALL OFF
C
14	 JJFF=O
6	 CONTINUE
A	 ADEPT
"DAR srGN
AP1C'AIF
JUMP .42
8CN:77277!H57777
HOOP
FORTRAN
GO TO 7
1	 CONTINUE
A	 MDAR OUTER
A	 ARIC'O
GO TO 7
2	 CONTINUE
A	 14DAR M1DLE
A	 ARIC'O
GO TO 7
3	 CONTINUE
A	 MDAR INNER
A	 ARIC'0
GO TO 7
A	 ADEPT
OUT£R:20000
MIDLE00400M
INNER10011W H
FORTRAN
7	 CONTINUE
RETURN
E116
^U40;
p3ag
3
i SUBROUTINE STASK
`	 C
C*** SUBROUTINE TO OPERATE THE WORT:-LOAD SIDC-TASK.
C
I14PLICIT FPACTION	 (F)
COI4IlONiCSTASI. -, MSTSK, TOT TX, ET I ME, LTON , 11SWOLD,T : MEN N,TIMEOFF
COMMOH/PFMTR ,V,Y.I , VG. VW, COSY,W, SI N :W, COS35, S I H35, 0ET gG .V NORM,  CRAB
C0J4M0NrPF . MTR/GAMJSA, ALPHA, BETA, FHI .VY.,VY,VL, THETA, AI XM, Y,R
COMMOfI/DPRMTR/VV, DX,I , DC-AMA, DALFA, DBEE"TA, DPH I, DT. VVZ
COMMON STORT(100),TOTT(150),r:TOPX9'150),STOPA(150),STORYC150)
COMt40N LOr'r.LOCD,01$$,XMISS(100).XH1T(100)
I'	 C
i	 C*w* UPDATE RUJJNING CLOCK AND LIGHT CLOG`:^ C
i..
TOT7X=TOTTX+D7
IF(MSTSK)16,100
1	 16 CONTINUE
ET I ME = ET I 14E+DT
C
n
C*o*	 IS LICHT ON?
C
IFCLTOH11,2
I	 CONTINUE
A	 ADEPT
MDAP, 11nSY.UP	 [SAMPLE RESPONSE SWITCH
S6AR'A ' F	 CIS IT UP?
JPLS SWUP	 EYES
MDAR MA;F:DN
S6AR'A'F
JPLS SWDN	 [IT IS DOWN
FORTRAU
C
C***	 SWITCH IS NOT ON
C
IN5W=0
GO TO 3
A	 ADEPT
MASY,UP: 10000	 Jk
MASKD11:04000
SWUP: HOOP
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3
C
C***
C
4
5
C
6
7
c
c0*0
C.
CORPECT RESPONSE
LOOT=LOOT+l
STORT(LOCT)=ETIME
XH1T(L0CT)=`M+60Q0.2+1153.
GO TO 9
IF(&SW-=OLDK, 7
INCORRECT RESPONSE
MISS=MlS5+1
xMISS(NIsS)=Xm*h0 &0.2+1153.
=OLM 1 NW
M ETIME-TIMEOFf)100.e.a
TIME TO TUPU LIGHT OFF (WITHOUT COPREC7 RESPONS0
FORTRAN
INSW=2
GO TO 3
A	 kDEPT
SwDu l HOOP
FORTRAN
INSU=1
3	 GO TO(7,5,4,14.5),INSW* LTOU +1
6	 CONT I lip}E
ir(NSWOLD)9.10
^k
13	 MISS-"I.5+1
;;	 XN I55^ ii I :,•7)-Y.14x^^080 .2+I I53.
9	 Coln I ME
A
	
	 ADEPT
HEAR mkSKOFF
is	 AF:IC'k'F
^
	
	 JU11P . +2
MASKOFF:77576!H77177
NOOP
FORTRAN
C
to
i
i .
10	 NXFEET=A8S(XM*6080.2)
LION=140D (t1X FEET. 2)+l
L	 INTEGERS=SHORT
GO TO CI1,12),LTOU
11	 CONTINUE
A	 ADEPT
IIDAR MRS112
AP,IC'0'F
JUMP ,+3
14ASK2:00200 ! H
MASY.3:A0001!N
NOOP
FORTRAN
GO 10 13
12	 CONTINUE
A	 MDAR MSY.3
A	 AP.IC'O'F
13	 ETIME=O.
INSW=NSW0LD=O
GO TO 100
14	 WR ITE(10,15)
15	 FOPIIATt5):,' ERPOR 114 SWITCHING LOGIC')
100	 CONTINUE
3
STORE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME, X,A,AND Y AT 5 SEC
INTERVALS: UNLE;S ALTITUDE IS LESS THAN 150, 	 r
C***
	
IN WHICH CASE STORE THEM AT 1 SEC INTEPVALS
C
TINT=5.	 i
IF(A.LE.150.)TINT=1.
IFtAMOD(TOTTX,TINT).GT.DT)GO TO 101
	 3
LOCD= LOCD+1
TOTT(LOCD)=TOTTY.
STOPM LOCD )=X14 ,• 6030. 2+1153
STORA(LOCD)=A
STORY(LOCD)=Y
101	 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE DYMIF
DYNAMICS-COMPUTING SUSROUTI1t£
GLOBAL DVZ,DT,MP,APP,P.Q,DR
REAL L,FLAPS
	 1a
COMM0?J,'Ct7TRL/T, FLAPS, CTETA,CFHI.CXI, GEAR, AFLAPE,SPBRK
COMMONiCNTRL/BTETA,BPHI,BXI
COtiFtOtl/PP74TR/V, X1 ,VG, VW.COSXW, SINr: 1J , CO$35, Sirl35, BETRG, V1IGP.M, CRAB
COi4t4OtIiPF'I-ITP,, GAttt4A, ALPHA, EFTA, PHI, VX, VY, V2, THETA, A, Y.N, `1, k
COMt4Ofii pPF.itTR/UV. D1(I . LCAt1A, i^ALFA, GBETk. DFH I , GT . DV2
COMMorl/ANG'S1ttA,SING,S1ttP.SItt8,S11AX,C'_:. A,GOS6,Cc3F',CQSX
COi4810N/AUTQ-, C)rBttK 1 , [,CEtif ' 2, DCP I CH, C,tPTF , C LF, U, V?u , I FL,I F E
COMMOtlrFD/ADF,VOP,CPI CHI CBUk,EPS, HER, RAD, GUST, THE TAI
CALL SAMPLE
'> J
COMPUTE GROUND EFFECT AWD ALT. EFFECT
4
GFEFF=1.+(U,5-V.."^;83.)^CA+£.)
Ale=A/1800.
Arl-F=2.*A18-AIB+ASR
VW YWtAEFF
CL=(0.6502+0.4902+FLAP'S)+GPEFF
CD=0.05+0.07&• 9*FLAPS+O.0ZN7TGEAR+0.157+SPFPY,
	 t	 '
V2=.V+'d
Y=ASS(V-10+1.
VERTICAL GUSTS CORP.ELATEG TO LATERAL GUSTS
GUSTZ=GUST-, 200.	 CREFF+AEFF
ALFAI=ALPHA-GUSTS
.' ITCTA=O
IF(ALFAI.LE.23.)GO	 TO 9
rF(ALFAI.LE.27.}GO	 TO	 10
L=O.
GO TO 11
9 L=CL*ALFig1*V2
GO	 TO	 11
10 L=CL+4.604(28.-ALFAI)*V2
I: 11 CONTINUE
, e
C**n SAMPLE AUTOPILOT MODE-SELECT SWITCHES
C
A ADEPT
S6AR'F
I' MDAP.'A IISKAPP
APAR'H'F
3PLS APP
JUMP MP
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G
C***
C
C
C
C***
C
3r	
I i
E
_ 14SKAPP:04000FHO
i
14SKAPR:020001HO
APP:	 HOOP
FORTRAN
C I
C41*4,	 COMPUTE PITCH C01414AND
I
C 1
ITETA=1
IF(A.LT . 200,.AND . A:GT.AFLACrE ) GO TO 12
TCOI-IL = C3.-2.5 *CAPTR ) *CIICH+3 . 4,DCPICH4•RAD
GO TO 15
12	 TCDHI=-3.*CGAMMA+3.03)-3..iUGAi4A4!RAD
15	 CONTINUE
I
CTET6=At41t11 (10 . , At4AXI C TC0111 , —! 0 ,))
A	 ADEPT
11P:	 NOOP
S6AR'F
MDAR' A NSKAPR
i
ARAR'H'F
JPLS APP I^ -
t JU14P MANP.
,
fi
APR:	 HOOP
-	 p	 ? FORTRAN
c
C**..h	 COMPUTE YAW AND ROLL COMMANDS i1 --
C `I
CPHI m—BETA {
IF(A.LT.AFLAP.E)CPHI=—(PHI+DPHI4P.AD*3.)
CXI=CRUX+(DC©NKI+DCEUK2)4RAD+3. ;
IF(A.LE,C —V2/120.))CXI=(35• —XI+BETAG)*5. i
A	 MAHR; HOOP
P=(0.0107*CPHI+0.005754C.XI)*V2/163£6,656
C1=CO.9o50-CTErA + 42+<L+COSA +GOSP- • w4• rOSG ) ilnaa. ) ^15^,A1.$08 '^- ^I.` DR-C0.03^rCG):I+BETA—i24'?a.ri3/V4R)-0 .00!83*Cr^HI!w4?/ •:0?65.&4*DT f^ i
I R=R+DPC
IFCITETA?13,14 ii
;.; .13	 CONTINUE ^^,.. {
!	 ; .i
C***	 COMPUTE THRUST IF IN AUTO PITCH MODE
i C 1
TC=170. !I
gl
{
L; IF(FLAPS.GT ,0,5)TC=150.
_
IF(FLAPS.GT .0,8)TC=1^0. I	 '.
IF(A.L.E,S.)TC=120, I^
T = ( (TC—V).e (20 , *DT4.GW)+D+L lI l Sl NA+Ot*$1110 /COSA
T=AttItl1CT,7500a,) ^^ 3
if^
.	
1
f	 14	 CONTINUE	 }.
DVNORPI=VW M ( S I IIXWµ--CGSX - COS SW*S I HYD--VHOR14
VNORM=VNORI4+DVIJOP14*DT
i	 DV=GW*<T*COSA-G-L*SI.NA--*SI PIG) *DT
OXI = GW /V,'COSG ti( L+S I NP-Ts ! S I IJB*C!] aP*COSA+DVtIOR ?I) *DT
DGAMA=GW /V k( (Li COSA+7-i :SINA ) *COSP -W*COSG)i DT
DA1_FA = ( Q-P 4 'S I NB) +DT-DGAI-1A' - COSP - DY.I h•S INP+CGSG
DBETA=DX1 k (COS A*CGSG+COSP-SI. NA+SIt=G)-GGAt1A*CDSA*SI NP- R+DT
DPHI =( P+,CG3A + O*SINI:*COSA + P4:SI14A)nDT+DXI*SI14G
XI=XI + f)XIkRAG
SETAG=BET Ai_+D BETA +RAD
SFTA=BETA,, - D'PIORM/Vi-RAD
CRAB= BETAG + ATA1* ( VtIORM, VG)-':*AD
PHI-PHI+DPHI4RAD
A=A+V?/60.WDT
XM=X1.1+V%/ &o 0 . N VT
;'=Y+VY+I . 68V4*DT
VG=VG+DV
V=VG-VW+ (COS (}L+r,OSx+ S I N %bI µ S I NX)
VX=VGtCO.S^,+ (^.0;35rGUSX+W 3 Nay*SIP=:{>
1 - 4'IIGF^14t C^'US?5+=1N:(- slrla$ µEOS}:)
VY=VG+COS,+;r,OSw5+;INS:-Sttls5^COSX)
1 +VNOPM' (COS s5oCUS X +SIN35 + SIIIX)
V2=VG«Slfl,+1U1.3367
DV.':=<DV+S III,+VGµrOSGrDGArIA)+1 .68894/DT
ALPHA=ALPHA*DALFA*P.AD
GA14MA =GAl:!;a + DGAI!p +12AC• +GUSTZ	 '
THETA=(+ALPHA - 2.+i,aMtlH) + CrjSFI + E?ETA*SltJP
THETAO=( 165000 . /CL/V2-2. +GAII14A) "COSP
XI=AtIOD(VI,340.)
PHI=AMOD^PHI,3hU.)
GRISPEFl-aMOUCGArtNa,36A. )
THETA=AM0D0HETH,360.)
A=AMAXI(A.D.)
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE RTOF
€ C
C^*x• 5USROU7IFlE 7Q CONVERT DATA RERL •• TO-FP,AC7I0!]
1
. GLOBAL TRIG, -FPICHI,FPCHI
II IMPLICIT FP.ACT ] ON (F) 1j COAICSON/PP.A4TR,,V , XI, VG, VW, COSXIU, S I11M, CO"S, $1 U-15. KTA a, VN f iRM , CRAB
i CQCItSgElif'C3 A{TR / GAF1FfR, ALPHA, BETA, PH 1, VX, VY, VZ, THETA, A, W. I , Y, P. ; •
COlHCO}! /ANG/SIt1rl,s I nc, SI l i p , SItlB,SINX,COSA,COS€ , CUSP,COL"X
C01*1Otl /FRAC /FV, FBIIY. , F p I CH, FA, F A 100 , FVZ. FHI,G , FADE. FVJR, ;= C P I CkI
COMMON/FRAC/FCBNK,DER,FHER,DATEi5), MODE (6),rTETAO
COI*10N/FD /ADF, VOF. CPI CH, CS ! lV.. EPS, HER, RAD, GUST. THE 7 AO ;.
-AtfOD(V,A00.))/200.
FEt]}; 1 : pH1 %360 . ^i
FailKmPsUK{+PBNK1
FFILHI =-THETA/3t-0.
FPICH=FPICHI+FPICHI
.
ff
E FT£TAO=THETA) / 1$0. F'
IF(A.LT. O.)A=O.
Ff+=(500.-kF.I0D(A, 100,. ))/500. j
FAI00=CS000.-AIIQDC+.10000.))/'5000.
fE FVZ=--FMINI (I ., AM4-.^I01Z/4UOE i .. -1
FHDGI=AMODC:
FHDG=FHDGI+FHDG1
FADF1=-ADF/360.
FHDF=PAGE 1 rFriDFl
Fb'QnI^-40R r 3+i4 .
FVOR=FVORI+•FVQRI
i C
C*** SAMPLE FLIGHT-DIRECTOR' MODE SELECTOR.
I C ^.
A ADEPT
S6AF:' F' H
14DAR'A MSKBTH
JPLS FoON
MDAP. UNO
ARMD FCPICH
j JUMP L2
If FDO	 s SSAR'F'H
I MDAR'A MSKFDP
JPLS PON !!
MDAR ZF:O
ARID FCPICH i
t it .^
^z.
9
1
188
fI
F
ROLL I	 SSAR' F' H -
.I MDAP.'A MSICFDR
JPLS RON
e 14DAR ZP.0
ARMS+ FCONK
` j
II
JUMP L2
USKBTH:	 01400 -'
143KFDP •	01000 Y
MSKFDR;	 00400
ZROi	 0!H4
UNO:	 0IH37777
PON t	 hoop
FORTRgNI
- F•PCHI=CPICH/360.
FPCH1 =FM 1142C0.1F,FMAK2(FPCH1.-0. IF) )
I` FCPICHA4.*FPCH1
A	 JU14P ROLL
A	 RON:	 NOOP
FSMK1--CStJKf360.
' FBNKI=F111N2(0. IF, FMAX2(F8UK1 s -0	 IF)
! FCBIIIC=F.£NN.1*4, ".
A	 L2.	 NOOP
.j ERP.=EPS'-RAD
-.i
-	 -	 TEMPP=HI19tX1 CEP.P..-2.5)	 -j	 i EP.PoWl1U1(2,5,TUMP)
FER=-ERF*0.24
Ir(m.E0.0.mn=0.0001
} AHER=HER*RAD!(XM*6030.2)
TEMPP=AMAX1(AHERr-0.7)
TEJ1P =AHIN1(0.7.TEMPP)
FHEP=TEMPt0.22257
4
j
I #	 ,..
•:
:
r
1
!
r
1:89
1
Qs
Ij
f
{
,
•
SUBROUTINE TRIG
SS C*** SUBROUTIt1E TO COMPUTE TRIG FUNCTIONS
EM ONCE FOR EACH DATA-UPDATE CYCLE`-
C
FRACTION COSH
ALPmALPHAfRAD
< ALP2=ALFwALP
SIIlA=ALP-ALP#^ALP2i6.
-, SINB=SETA/RRD
1 C0SA=I.--ALP/2.+ALP24-ALP2i24.
F$RPIA=GRHLSR^360 .
# FGAMA=FGAIiA+FCAMA
FPHI=PH£^36G.
^t FPHI=FPHI+FPHI
' FXI=Y,lr$60.
FXI=FXI+FXI
j SING=FSIIt(FGAMA)j COSG=FTOP (l C l3SN )
SINP=FSIN(FPHI)
.i C0SP--FT0R( C0S11)
SINX=FS£NtFY.l
COS+{=FTOPi K(JSIt?
RETURN
1i
^1 END
!
^;
E(
1
^ I
Ef
^i 11
^E 1
^^opt	 kJaAp
_	 t
} 19 0
1
1t
114AGE DIALS
C
Cw.xw SUBROUTINE TO DISPLAY THE IIISTRUNEUT PANEL
C $FTIAX _,INTEGER
IMPLICIT FRACTION(F)
COMMDtI/FPAC/FV,FBtJK,FPICH.FA,FA100,FV2,FHDG,FADE,FVOR,FCPIC'H
00;•1t9Oil/FRAC7FCBt4K, FER, FHER, DME(S) , I-IODE<G), FTETAO
LINKAGE PTR(e),.C:BARS(12),LYt4E(4),P71TR.1(10),PIITR(20)
LINKAGE GSI (SO , LOCI (5),ADFN(19),VOR11(10),HDt4(5>
C
Cwww ADD FTIMX TO ITIt4E, TO UPDATE THE
C*** DATA-UPDATE CLOCK
C.
4I T I t:E-SIT 1 t•1E*'GFMjX
POSCHAR(0.2417F,-0.01434F,-0.3F,'OS35")
POSCHARC ME)
POSCHA.F.(MCDE.>
DY(FHER)
TABLE2D(GSI)
LDY(O.F)
TABLEZD(HDNG)
LDXM;P*0.2557F)
TABLE2D(LOCI)
LDY.(-0.75F)
LDYCO.49F)
LSCL(0.2757)
LRZ(FV)
TADLEZD(Ftl7R)
LDX(0.71F)
LDY(O.52F)
LSCL(0.23F)
LRZ(FA)
TAPLE2D(PttTR)
LPZ(FA100)
TABLE2D(PUTRi)
LDX(O.71E26F)
LDYC-0.20575F)
LSCL(0.2e.5F)
LP.2CFVZ-0.5F)
TABLE2DCPNTR)
i
r._
	 l_^L	 l..	 1	 I- ° 	I
.r.
E
i
1
LDXf4.F)
t LSCL(O.33F)
LR.Z(FFIDG)
Mi—L2D ( SCCARD)
A	 2DT BUG
.:i ROT2f-0.19444F)
DX(FER)
TABLE2D ( LY14E)
LRZ(FHDG) i
LDRC--0.7450
LDY(-• 0 , 212F)
LSCLC0.275F)
{ ROTZ(FADF)
TABLE2DCADFi1)
ROTZ(FYOP_—FADF)
TABLE?D ( VGRU)
LRZ(FHDG>
TABLE2D ( SCCARD) r
LDY(0.56F)
LSCL (O .32F)
LRZ (FSt1K )
TABLC2D C PTR)
LSCL(1,OF) f'
ROT:((FP I CH)
{
LAI(17B.0 . 5F)
TACLE3D ( BHPZQH) 13
LSCL( 0 . 32F i R .:.^
ROTX(FCFICH4TETAO)
l
f
POT— ( FCE;IW) !1
TAELEZVCBARS) !	 a
TABLEZO ( CBARS) i{
t
^i
RETUR14 f
{
e 3
;i
71}ir
F
192
1
!i
!
F
f
DATA2DCLYNE)
_f
{
ESETC0.00
i LINEC9.F . D,43F,Q . F,^0,528faF)
EIIDL IST
€I	 E EUDDATA
DATAZD(PIITR1 }
11OVEC-0.02F,0.04F)
%RAW <-0.02F,-0.3F)
i DRAWCO.OF,-0.36F)
DRAW(0.02F,-0.3F)
DRA000,02F,0.04F)
A.
DRAWL-0.02F,0.04F)
: EHDLIST
EGDDATA
i DATA2D (PIITR)
2SET(0.0F)
DRAW<-042F!-0.560
ii DRAIJ(-0 . 02F,-0.74F)
DP.AW<9 .OF, •- O , °F )
DE:AW40.02F.—O.74F)
4; DRAWf0 .02F,-0.55F)
.:; DPAW(.O. OF, —0.5F)
DRAWCO.OF.—O.26F)S
DR.AWCO,04F.-0.2F3 1
DR.AW(0 . 04F.O.OF)
s^ DRAU1t.9.06F.0.1F)4
DRAW(-9.OGF.O.tF)
s DRAW(-0.04F,O.OF)
;f DRAW(-0.04F,—O.2F).
DRAWCQ . OF.-O.26F)
MOVE(O. OF, 0.nF)
DR.AW(O.DF,O.OF)
ENDL I ST #y
t
EUDDATR fi
€
}sl
i
}
a
C
DATg2D(6Si)
2SETCO.OF)
MOVE(-D.3F,0.55F)
DRAW(-0 . UF, 0.59F)
DRAW(-0.3F,0.63F)
IMCC-0.3F. -0-30F)
DP.AW (-O.36F,-0.34F)
DRAW(-0.3F,-0.3SF)
ENDLIST
ENDDATA
DATA2D(LOCI)
?SETC0.0F)
MOVE(-0.04F,0.I6F)
DF.AWCO.OF,0.12F)
DRAWC0.04F,0 16F)
ENDLIST
ENDDATA
DATA2DCADFW
25ET(O.OF)
MGVE(-0.[F,0.5F)
DRAW(-0.1F,-0.7F)
DRAW(O,OF, -0.SF)
DRAW 0.:r'j-0. 7F)
DRAW(O.IF,0.5F)
DRAW(-0,14F4,5F)
DRAW(0.4F,0.8F>
DRAW0 .I4F,O.5F)
DRAW(O. W.0.5F)
MOVE(O.OF.,0.9F)
DRAW<O.OF,4.*F)
MOVE(O.OF,O.OF)
DRAW(O.OF.O.OF)
MOVE<O.OF,-0.3F).
DRAW(O.OF,-0,9F)
ENDLIST
ENDDATA
f	
{
•
l	 ^
y	 '
1	
^
.
DATA2D(VORII)
1> ZSETCO.OF)
MOVECO . OF,O,SF)
3i DRAU( -0.04F.0.6F)
DPAW(-0.04F,-0.$F5
DPAWC0.0+1F,-•9,8F)
DPAW(9.04F40,6F)
DPAW(O.OF,O.3F)
140VE(O.OF,0.9F)
4j DRAWCO.OF.-0.9F)
EIIDLIST
EHDDATA
A	 ADEPT
BUS ,	0
1631224426;16?'221261:131442334511631224427
j 200002S743i1146211562:1I46Z1546110631414431
0767613244:11462t5461:6631462316:6314655465
60009139541600001 3E755i 600001i055;70OQOU5462
7000005453'i0+)90054631100007ZS14;100OQ72315
^r 10000?e315:206Uu 64922: 2A00064023^l777764Ut3
FOP,TPRII
r DATA20(PTR)
j ZSET(O.F)
ROVE(O.F4,8333F)
t DPAW(-0.15,F,0.6667F)
DP.AW0.15F40.6667F)
DRAW0 ,OF,O.9333F)
- EUDLIST
ENDDATA
DATA2DCCSARS5
ZSET(-1.QF)
iI
V	
r
1	 1
z^
r	 DATA2D(HDN6)
ZSETCO.OF)
I40VE(-^-015F,0.03625F)
DRAB?( P.F,0.0035F)
DRAW(0.015F,0,03625F)
ENDLIST j=
t	 ElIDDATA
F	 RETURN
f	 E14D
ri
19'7
PROGRAM PFP
C
C***	 PROGRAM: FAIL PITCH
C
GLOBAL ITIME,FP
IMPLICIT FRACTION (F)
LOGICAL COIIE
RF,AL FLAPS
L	 OTSEPRORS=SHORT
COMMCJII/CSTASY -INSTSK, TOT TX, ETI14E , LTO11,11SWOLD , TIMEGFr, CIMEOFF
COMMOfl/C11TRL / T, c"
COI.IMON/.HTPL/.'TETA, EPH1 , 6XI
COMMON /P RIII R, , V, VI. VG, VW, COSXW . S1N:.U , COS35,SIN35 , EETAG,VNORM,CRAB
COMM0N /PPFITR /GA1lMA, ALPHA. 2ETA, PHI , V:S, VY, VZ, THETA, A, X14, Y, R
COMMON/DFPMTP: D' + . DX 1 , DGAMA, DALFA, DBETA, DPH I , DT. C,YZ
COMMON/ Atiit /SI NA, Si1::. SIti p , S ING, SIf4 x, COSA, COS C. C_':P, COSX
COmKOtt /FPAC /FV,FSiM •FPT CH, FA, FRI00 , FVZ.FHDfi.FmPF , FVOP,FCPICH
COMMON /FF tr,,FCLtfV,FEP.,FIRER,L,1"•E(5),MODEl6:,FTET-0
CJ14?-1011 'FD %AVF,VOR,CPICH,C;.	 CP S, HEP,F A D, GUS T.T'^ETRn
COMMON/AUTO / Dr. BI1 1'. I,PCENKG C• CPICH,CAPTR,G1d, III, 'd O , IFLkPE
COMtION LOi^D, Ft77T(1571,5TC^l?'l.<15ii.yTifRisllSlfS.STUr'l•.1Sil)
DATA RsiD/r7.2 '3G/,Lf/1v54nQ ,/. G!D•C,4001155/
DATA TPt 1:F'1/0.4S15 /. Tr!PV- P.2/0 063 ••. TMEYR/0.0*76/
DATA TN: ,A/-0 .9.`..2933/
DATA CGS:09/0.17.^646/,SINXW-i-90436$7
DATA COST /0.?1915c'/,SIt135f0,5i3:76/
WRITE<10,20055
READ(10,C005YNAHE.AFRIL
2005 FOPIIAT<' ENTEP 5-LETTER CODE AND ALT. I'/)
2006 FOPMAVi;5/F6.05
DECODE (c „20 Q$, NAME o 101 NAME
1F(	 R.18
DECODE<5.2007,HAME,H)IDIST 	 1
2007 F0PMAT<3:4, I1)
2008 F0FMAT(2X,A:0
VW0mIDIST+S.
PRA.ID=IDIST*11.6936
IF<NAtIE.E0.777777404UB)PRAND=O.
ENTRY FP
1.----1	 1 .- 1
	 1	 1	 I	 I	 I
Caa=a	 INITIALIZE ALL VALUES
!	 I CONTINUE
A	 ADEPT
NDAR MSTSKON
ARAD PRDET
HDAR IiSTASK
ARAD SELECTOR
MDAR TURNOFF
ARIC'A'F
HDAR HSTASK
SGAR'A'F
JPLS MSTSKON
j	 FORTRAN
MSTSK=O
GO TO 8
r	 A	 ADEPT
MSTASK:	 01H00200
HSTSVOIJ:	 flOU3'
FORTFrAN
8	 CONTINUE
HSTSK=O
GAMMA=0.
DGAh1R=0 .
XI=65. !
PHI=O. s	 .:
FENK=0.OF
ALPHA=6,
TKTA0=4.
SETAG=D .
BETA=O.
A=2500.
DRNG=2550,
AFLARE =O. J
IFLRRE =O
I014=IMI9=IIM=O
JJFF=O
ETIHE=TOTTX=TDETECT=TIDENT=TFAIL=O.
IFAIL=(DETECT=IDENT=O
LOOT=LGCD=O
LTON=N ISS=NSWOLD=O
T I14CON=5,
TIHEOFF=2.
1
i
198
3

}	 C**x	 START THE DISPLAY
A	 SPSR £GP,AFY.
((	 A	 *,DIALS
i	 A	 5
C* *	 INITIALIZE DATA—UPDATE CLOCK
2 ITIMC=t
C***
	
	
ENTER. WAIT LOOP IF SWITCH E (START) IS NOT ON
IFC.NOT.SWTTCHC8))G0 TO 2
C***	 EXECUTE UNLESS SWITCH 12 (FREEZE) IS ON 	 p
6 IFC.NOT.SWITCH(12))G0 TO 3
C ox**	 AFTER SWITCH 12 HAS BEEtt PRESSED. EXIT IF SWITCH 16 IS Olt...
7 IF(SWITCH05))GO TO 4
C***
	
	 OR INITIALIZE VALUES IF SWITCH 4 (IC) IS ON...
IF(SWITCH(4))GO TO 5
C**-^
	
	 OR STA RT EXECUTIOtt AGAI14 IF 5WITCH 8 IS ON...
IF(SWITCH(8))GO TO 5
C***
	
	 OR I11ITIALIZE DATA — UPDATE CLOCK AND ENTEk A WAITING LOOP
ITIME=1
GO TO 7
1	 5 C014T I NUE
!	 C***	 STOP THE DISPLAY AND GO BACFC TO INITIAL VALUES
A	 JPSR SNHALT	 E
A NOOP
GO TO I
C***	 START EXECUTION OF A NEW DATA —UPDATE CYCLE,
t '	 C***	 COMPUTE DT (=TIME IN SECS OF PREVIOUS CYCLE:)
C**n	 AND INITIALIZE DATA— UPDATE CLOCK
3 TIME=ITIME
ITIME=O
DT=TIME/I20.
CALL DYNNF
CALL TRIG
C*'l*
	
COMPUTE RANDOM DISTURBANCE (OUSTS)
L	 INTEGEF.S=LONG
:RNUM=MOD(0'701*IRNUM+3927:,30000)
P.NUM=IRmjm
L	 IFITEGERS=.SHORT
LyVWt = (RilUrt .10oo0,-0 .5)*P32AtIp
GUST=GUST+(DVWI — O. t0472*OUST)*DT
44	 VW=VWO+GUST
F
F;
y .s
F
y
{
.4
200	 -
_m
_	 F
f
^
E
zF C IFAIL*1DETECTD I0 . 13
C***	 STORE TI14E OF FAILURE IDENTIFICATION
10	 CONTINUE
ADEPT s
'`
S6AR^F
-
ARAR'H'F
!I FiDAR'A CORRECT 	 CIS PITCH A. p:.	 OR PITCH F.D.	 "ON"?.
-. I JPLS 110CHANGE	 EYES. NO IDENTIFICATION OCCURED. f
AMID TSELECTOR	 MO. STORE 0 ItI TSELECTOP
MDXO SELECTOR	 CIS THERE ALREADY A 0 IN SELECTOR?
jj JPLS CHANGE	 ENO.	 IDEUTIFICATIOrf HAS JUST OCCURED. 3
i JUNp NOCHAtIGE	 EYES.	 IDENTIFICATION ALREADY RECORDED.
^Y CORP.ECT:	 0I H05000
f TSELECTOR.	 0
r SELECTOR:	 ; j
CHANGE:	 F1DAR TSL"ECTDP. ^,r	 j
ARMD SELECTOR
I! FORTRAN
TIDEFIT=TOTTX
IDENT =i
µ ^
ji CPICHI=O,
A	 NOCHANGE: HOOP
11	 COtfTIMJE
XFEET=:'M+S0S0, 2
' IFCXFEET.EQ.0.)Y.F£ET=1.'t.
YFII LE=Yi6090 , 2
C. **	 COMPUTE THETA — DDT (=PITCH—A3,;LE TIME—RaTE OF CHANGE)
TDOT=(DALFO+D,At1A)*COSP+DBETA*SItlP+CrFTA:RAD*COSP—(ALPHA+C,AMMA)
^	 ` 1	 ^+SIt^P%RHC?}+•UPHI
C.•**	 FLARE COI-MAND COMPUTATION
IF(IFLAPE)33.35 .
i 35	 DENOHwZ .,*VX+101.336T
3	 i AFLAP, E= Al31N1.((15.—DP.1I(;*VZ/GEttOM), 120, f
I'F(A.GT.AFLARE)GO TO 31
IFLARE=1
_1 _	 11_	 1 ._	 I	 J	 I	 I
TAU=DRNG/DENOl,l
V20-AMINI(CVZ+150.),-150.)
CPICHI=O.
41ODF D="FLR.
LABELCMODE!
ZSETCO.F)
MOVEC0.23F,0.66F)
WRITE(16,556>MQDFD
556	 FORMAT C 8S" , E4 )
ENDLIST
33	 HERI=A+TAU*VZ^15,
HEDOT=VZ,,60.+TAU*DVZ
GO TO 32
31	 HER.=A-XFEET*TNGSA
HEP.I=HER
HEDOT=V2i60.-VX4-1.688944,TNGSA
32	 IFCIFAIL)405,401
401	 IFCA-ARSCAFAIL))403.403,400
403	 IFASL=1
TFAIL=TOTTX
405	 IF( IDEr1T)400,404
404	 HERI=HER+0,1156935*kFAIL
C*lf,*	 FLIGHT-DIPECTOR PITCH COMMAND
400	 DCPICH--0.6*(0.0005+CHEDOT+0.034+HER1)+0.5*TDOF)-0.034+CPICHI
CPICHlA=CPICHI+DCPICH*fiT
DCPSCH=(-0.6t.-0.0341,
1 CPICHIA+DCPICH)eZ.
CPICHI=CPICHI+bCP1CH*DT
CPICH=CPICHI*PAL• t3.*<l +IFLRP,EwC2.*ABSLCV?+I50,3iVZO)-1.!)
IF(IFLARE)8001,S402
8001	 IF(VZ.GT.-150.)CPIC8=rMIflI(O.,C-ABS!CPICH)))
8002 CONTINUE
IF(A.LE.AFLAPE)GO TO 22
C***	 CEUTEP. FLIGHT-DIRECTOR. COMMAND-E=ARS IF OUTSIDE Or
iC**
	
	 FLIGHT-DIRECTOR LATERAL COMMAND
IF(XM.EQ.1.23)Y.M=1.2301
EPS=YMILE.,o.23-XM)
.	 EPSDT-N)Cr3600.^YiSILErECX1t-1.23)WSKI4-1.23)7-V'rr3600./CYtd-1.23)
DCSM',l=-(0.1*C5.9244*DXi+3.32*DPH1+139.6rEPSDT
1 +0.432*PHI/RAD+2.49PEPS)+0.164CBtli11)
DCEiNK2=0 .06889* 48.6s • D;{1+0 .3*DPHI+l80 . +EPSDT)--1 .06*CStlK2
C8t4.=CSrlK+( DM;K 14 tDMW,2 7 *DTwRoD
C8tlK1-CBNK.I+DMll, *DT
C9NK2=C9M,'2+DCBMl2+DT
IFCABStEPS).LE.0.045)GO TO 21
CBNIC=CBIlt;1=CBIIK2=DCENK 1=DCBIlY.2=0 .
21	 CONTIME
C8NY,=AM0D<CB11K. 360. )
I.F( X19. EQ. -5.4896)%M=-5.4895
ADF=35,-ATAN(YM1LErC-,101-5.4P96))*PAD
IF( M.GT.-5.4S96)AGF=AC-F+1 v0.
IF(MM. EQ. -0. 0-, 11)XM=-Q .0.410
VOR-35.-ATAN(CYMILE-0.6908)e,(-0.0411-XM)ikP.AD
IF<XI+S.GT.-0.0411)VOP=VOR+19,0.
ADF=At40G<ADF, 360. )
VOR=AM0D! VOP.. ?60 . )
CALL RTOF
CALL FECRD
pIS7^^aURTfCY.tl+0.04L1)^*2+CYt4ILE-0.5?03)++•2)
LA$EL(DME)
li
i
^_
k
CONE=. FALSE.
^ ! i0tt=1b1M=IIt4=0
IF( EPS.LE.0.05.At1D.EPS.GT.-0.05)C011E=.TRUE..
4.1 C***	 TURII OUTER MARKER LIGHT Ott
+ j IFCABS( ?It•1+5.439C-) . LE.TtIR!: RI.At1D . COt=E)IOM=1
C* yl*	 TURH MIDDLE MARKER LIGHT 01I
IFCASS(XM40.78565. LE. TMRKR2.AND.. CONE) IMt4=1
C*4'*	 TURD! INNER. 11APKER LIGHT ON
;III IFCABSCXM+0.1896).LE.TMRKR.AND.	 CONE	 )IIIt=1
'`
CALL	 liEtCOtISCIOfi . Itlf1.IIi4,dJFF)
IF<1FAiL)!2,l3
12	 CONTINUE
C*4^*	 STORE TIME OF FAILURE DETECTION
A	 ADEPT
14DAP. DETECT
S6AR'A'F	 [SAMPLE DETECTION SWITCH
JPLS DETON	 E17	 is	 "!]II"
JU14P DETOFF	 [IT	 IS "OFF"
DETECT : 0 ! HO 1100
PRDET: 0
DETOU.	 MDXO PRDET	 EWA$ IT "Ott" VE:FORZ?
JPLS .. +2	 E.II0
1 JU14P DETOFF	 EYES
ARMD PPDET
1 FORTRAN
TDETECT=TOTTY
a
1DETECT=1
A	 DETOFF:	 HOOP
13	 CONTINUE J
C***	 EXIT IF ALTITUDE=O !
IFCA)4.4.6
4 CONTINUE
A	 JPSR INHALT
CALL RECRD
A	 ADEPT
MDAR TUR110FF
RRIC'A 'F -:; -1
Jump .+2
TURNOFF:
	 77076!H57777
HOOP
FORTRAN
E `
XFF=Xt4ti6030.2+1153. c
JJJ
II
I
- I 	 1	 3
y
i
. 	 204
ffff
use...
.,	
-.	 -	
-	
__ _ .^^.._...	 ,._.., .^...... ....`........w^c,.d.....t...........^w.^.w..t.
r^
c
.	 e
I	 '
i WRiTEC25.2000)
f}
. ^ 'UI?iTE<25.20017XFF, Y. V -f
WRITE(2S.2002)V? E
WRITE:(25,2004)AFLARE:
' XI=X i —BETAG
^.
TRACK=XI+CRAB
TJ£TECT=TDETE CT— TFAIL
TI DEN T=TIDENT—TFAIL
WP.ITE<25,2003) THE TA. PHI.X I. TRACK, CRAB, DT, LOCO, TDE7ECT,
1 TIDENT
j 2000 FORMAT (/////27:5,"PARAMETERS AT TOUCHDO',914 OR AT SIUPACTIO11:"/)
1 2001 FOPMAT(27X,"DISTANCE FROM THRESHOLD ".F15,0." FT.", , %?
"/1	 27X4"DISTANCE FPOM CENTERLINE",F15.0," FT.
`
2	 27X,"INDICATED AIRSPEED 	 ",FSS.O." KNOTS") j
2002 FORilAT(27X."VERTICAL SPEED 	 ',F15.0."	 FP11")
2009 FORMAT (27X o "FL , iPE COMMANDED AT ALT.	 ".F15.1,"	 FT.")
iIs 2003 FORMATC /27X,"PITC14 ANGLE 	 ',F5.0,"	 DErss.1/
1	 27X,"BARK ANGLE	 ",F5.0,"	 DEGS."/
2	 27X, "HEADING	 ",F5.0,"	 OtICS."/
7	 27X,"GROUND TRACK 	 ".F5.(9,"	 CEGS.
3	 2799"CRAB ANGLE	 ", F5.0,"	 DEGS."//
4	 27X,"	 DT	 =",F7.4,,
5	 27X,"LOCD=",I3/
6	 27X,"TIi-sE TO DETECTION 	 =	 ",F6.1,"	 SECS."/
7	 27X."TI33E TO	 IDENTIFY	 =	 ',F6.1,"	 SECS.")
IF(INAME.E0.4040404040D)GO TO 601
4 CALF. OUTPUT
f ` 601 CONTINUE ?',
b	
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SUBP.OUTIRE OUTPUT
DIT•7EN5ION IBUFF(2083
OPE11[21,0,2.O1SUFF,NAME) 3
WRITE ( 21)XFF , Y,Y, +IZ, THETA. PHI,Y.,I, CRAB .TDETECT,TIDENT	 ,iIAME
UP.I.TE(2i)LOCD,(TOTT(I);STORX(1),STOPACI),STOfiY(I>,I-1,LOCD)
DO	 1 K=1,50
:::.. CONTINUE
j I	 CONTINUE
} CLOSE(21) 1
OPENE224;2,01SUFF,'wHITSTASt(*1)
LOOT-a
O ITE(22)LOCT
DO 2 K=1,50.
- CONTINUE
2	 CONTINUE
9 CLOSE(22)
OPEN(23,0,2i01 BUFF, '*01 SSTASK*') #
NRTTE(23)JIISS3 UO 3 K=1.50
CONTINUE{ 3	 CONTINUE
CLOSEC23)
RETURN
a
E14D
1
A '
S
i #
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SUBROUTINE RECRD
C ^.
i i C*** SUBROUTINE TO RECORD . RUN DATA
C IMPLICIT FRACTION (F)
COMMON/CSTASK/1iSTSK, TOT T X, ETI ME. LTON,NSUOLD,TIMEON TIMEOFF
:	 3 COMtdON/PRt4TR/ V,X I.VG, VW, COSXU S1t1XW,COS35.SlU35r31 TAG.VNORt1.CRAS
'i Coll MON/PP.11TP./GAHRA, AL.PPA -13 ETA, PHI , VX, VY, VZ; THETA, A. %FL. Y. R.
COt ?loN /DPRFITR/DV, OX I , DGAtiA, DfiLFA. DOCTA, DPH i, DT, CV_
COMMON LOCD,TOTT(150).STORX( 150).STORA<150).STORY<150)
^;
C
C*A, * UPDATE RUNNING CLOCK
i C
.^ TOTTX=TOTTY.+DT
f
G C
C**O STORE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME, X,A,AIID Y AT 5 SEC
.j C+** INTERVALS; U11LESS ALTITUDE IS LESS THAN ISO,
C**+ IN WHICH CASE STOPS THE14 AT 1 SEC INTERVALS 9
7ItHT=5.
` fF"tA. LE. 154 . )FI1lT-1 .
Ir0MOD(TOTTX,TlUT).GT.DT)G0 TO 101
I` LOCD=LOCG+1
"	 { TOTTCL0CD)=TOTTX
STORX(L0CD)=XH*6080 .2+1153.
' STORA(LOCD) =H
STORYCL.00D}=Y
101 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
s
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INSTRUCTIONS T 0 PILOT
You are the pilot--in-command of a Boeing-707123 on a
flight to Boston.
^F
You will be asked to fly a number of ILS approaches
i to touchdown on Runway 4R at Logan in zero-ceiling; zero--
_	 visibili.ty conditions. 	 Your task is to stay as close as
is
you can to the nominal ILS path and to execute the best
k
lariding possible under the circumstances.
The approaches will be flown with the autopilot in
different modes:	 Some may be fully automatic, some may
have autopilot coupling in one axis, and some may be
fully manual, with flight-director guidance.
'The guidance-and-control equipment that you have on	 {
board is not too reliable and has been known to malfunction.
occasionally in the past. 	 Therefore, you should keep up
your instrument scan to detect`di.acrepancies which might
indicate a guidance-and-control system failure.	 !
All the approaches will start from the same point: You
I;
-
'' are 12 miles so.uth-west of the.airport at.250. 0 feet AGL,
flying heading.065 to intercept the localizer inbound.
3	 ;.
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INSTRUCTIONS TO PILOT - WORKLOAD MEASUREMENT
This is our "Pilot Workload Assessment" experiment. You
Hhave two tasks to perform:
	 i.
The piloting task, which should be your major.concern
at all times, consists of flying an ILS.approach to 	 {
touchdown on Runway 4R.
Four secoadary task is identifying,, and responding to,
the two Lights above the cenrer panel. One or the other
of the lights will illuminate at random times and will
stay on for two seconds. Your response consists of moving
the thumb-switch which is mounted on the left horn of the
yoke in the direction of the light - UP for the upper light,
DOWN for the lower light.
To be scored as correct, your response must be made
while the light is on.
Let me again emphasize that your primary concern should 	 +,
be to do the best that you can flyinq the approach.
Respond to the lights if, and only if, you feel that you
can do so without sacrificing your piloting performance.
S
{

iAge	 SexName
Jets: Hours
Rec.: Hours
Private Flight Experience:
Types
Types
Hours Types
Airline	 Position
Pilot's License
Type Ratings
Commercial Flight Experience:
Transport Aircraft - Jets: Hours
Types
Recip.: Hours
Types
Military Flight Experience:
Simulator Experience:
QUESTIONNAIRE - PERSONAL DATA. PRECI+DDIG pAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
QUESTIONNAIRE -- WORKLOAD EVALUATION.
Please give only one answer per question.
I. In my opinion, with respect to response characteristics,
the simulated aircraft was:
[ ] Excellent
[ ] Good
[ ] Fair
[ ] Somewhat uncomfortable: Quite sensitive or
quite sluggish
[ ] Very uncomfortable:
extremely sluggish
Extremely sensitive or
[ ] Nearly uncontrollable
[ ] Uncontrollable
II. In my opinion, with respect to control characteristics,
the simulated aircraft was:
[ ] Extremely easy to control with excellent precision
[ ] Easy to control with good precision
[ ] Controllable, with somewhat inadequate precision
l Controllable, but with very little precision
[ ] Difficult to control
I	 ^	 _1	 I	 I
Ill.	 in my opinion, with respect to the demands placed
f	 on me-as the pilot, the simulated aircraft was:
I
	
[ ]	 Completely undemanding, very comfortable to fly
i
C 1 Largely undemanding, comfortable to fly
] Mildly demanding of pilot attention, skill
or effort
	
]	 Very demanding of pilot attention, skill or
effort
	
C ]	 Nearly uncontrollable
	
[ ]	 Uncontrollable
}(-	 IV.	
In my opinion., the following is true with respect to
€' f the deficiencies in the simulated aircraft:
`'	 [ ]	 No noticeable deficiencies
f'
C ] Very mild deficiencies with no significant effect
on performance
C ] Deficiencies with effects on performance which
j	 are easily compensated for by the pilot
i
	
]	 Moderately object_ -,)Y:able deficiencies
^f
^`	 ]	 Very objectionable deficiencies
i'
^o	 C ]	 Nearly uncontrollable
	
C ]	 Uncontrollable
l^
l
V. in my opinion, turning off the lights' interfered with my
performance on the piloting task:
7 Not at all, no interference
7 To a negligible extent
[ 7 Some interference, resulted in few piloting errors
[ ] Moderate interference, caused some piloting errors
C 7 Definite interference, resulted inconsiderable.
pilotingg errors
[ 7 Nearly complete interference, piloting was severely
.impaired	 8
C 7 Complete .interference, could not perform piloting
task	 a
VI. In my opinion, the following is true with respect to my
	 3
responses to the lights:
[ ] Always responded immediately
17 Always responded, but occasionally too late
[ 7 Usually responded, and responses were never late
j 7 Usually responded, but responses were sometimes late
[	 Often failed to respond, but responses were.
usually on time
C 7 Often failed to respond and responses were usually
too late
t	
5
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